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Abstract
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale cre-
ates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value
for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding
equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator
wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an
essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction
and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribu-
tion, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch
auctions.
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1 Introduction
Standard auctions—open English, sealed-bid first-price, sealed-bid second-price and Dutch—
are used in many instances where resale is permitted. For instance, a good purchased on
eBay can be resold on eBay. Nevertheless, much of the received theory of standard auctions
assumes that resale is not possible (cf. Klemperer’s 1999 literature survey). In environments
where any standard auction has an efficient equilibrium, so that no obvious motive for resale
exists, it is tempting to think that the absence of resale opportunities is an inconsequential
assumption. However, the assumption still matters.
This paper considers an environment with symmetric independent private value (SIPV)
bidders and an additional bidder, called speculator, who is commonly known to have no
use value for the good on sale. In the absence of a resale opportunity abstaining is, of
course, a dominant strategy for the speculator, and any standard auction allocates the good
efficiently and yields identical revenues (Vickrey, 1961). We show that if an inter-bidder
resale opportunity exists, the speculator can play an active role in any standard auction
format. If she is active, the final allocation is not efficient, and there is no longer allocation
or revenue equivalence across standard auctions.
The main insights are conveyed using just two bidders: a single bidder with a private use
value for the good and a speculator. The bidders engage in a 2-period interaction where first
a standard auction takes place and then the winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
loser. We construct perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies. The equilibrium
constructions generalize, under appropriate assumptions, to environments with any number
of SIPV bidders (see Section 5). Moreover, the equilibria remain valid if any number of
speculators can bid in the auction (see Remark 3 and Remark 7).
In the case of first-price auctions we assume that, as in a Dutch auction, the loser’s bid
remains private. There exists an essentially unique equilibrium.1 The private-value bidder
uses a strictly increasing bid function and the speculator randomizes her bid in such a way
1The only possible source of multiplicity is that the speculator’s post-auction belief may allow for multiple
optimal resale offers; but this happens with probability 0 on the equilibrium path.
2
that she may tie with any type of the private-value bidder. The speculator makes zero profit
in equilibrium: the larger her realized bid the larger her resale profit when she wins, but her
bid always equals her resale profit.
For second-price or English auctions there is a continuum of equilibria that differ by
allocation and profitability to the speculator. For each use value in the support of the
underlying probability distribution, there exists an equilibrium where all private-value bidder
types having lower use values abstain from the auction and wait for a resale offer from the
speculator while types having higher use values bid them and win the auction. Unlike in
a first-price or Dutch auction, a speculator can make profits in a second-price or English
auction. The larger the chosen use value, the larger the speculator’s equilibrium resale offer
and payoff.
Previous work on standard auctions with resale considers environments where resale is
required to achieve an efficient allocation.2 Haile (2000, 2003) evaluates the properties of
standard auctions in symmetric environments where precise information about use values
becomes available only after the initial auction. Haile (1999) and Bose and Deltas (2002)
consider environments where some bidders cannot participate in the initial auction.3 Finally,
Gupta and Lebrun (1999) examines a first-price auction with two asymmetric private-value
bidders who observe each other’s use value after the auction.4
Bose and Deltas (2002), as well as Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) in a multiple-unit
auction setting, appear to be the only auction models apart from ours that explicitly consider
0-value bidders. In both of these models the 0-value bidders represent intermediaries or
2There is also a growing literature on optimal auctions with resale, see Jehiel an Moldovanu (1999),
Ausubel and Crampton (1999), Calzolari and Pavan (2002), and Zheng (2002). Our model is closest to
Zheng. He considers general asymmetric environments with independent private values. At any stage,
including the initial stage, the current owner of the good chooses a mechanism that is optimal given that
each future owner will choose an optimal resale mechanism. Zheng’s main contribution is the construction
of an equilibrium that implements the initial-seller-optimal allocation via resale under certain assumptions.
Speculators are not needed in this construction and it is optimal for each current owner to exclude them.
3This motive for resale is proposed in Milgrom (1987).
4It is well-known that a first-price auction with asymmetric private-value bidders and no resale opportu-
nity is generally inefficient (see Krishna, 2002, Section 4.3.3).
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middlemen in environments like treasury bill auctions or large real-estate auctions where the
final consumers are confined to the resale market, while our model addresses how 0-value
bidders can “invade” markets with private-value bidders.
Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3 we construct the equilibrium for first-price
and Dutch auctions with resale. Section 4 deals with equilibria for second-price and English
auctions with resale, and section 5 discusses the extension of the model to multiple SIPV
bidders.
2 Model
We consider environments with two risk-neutral bidders who are interested in purchasing a
single indivisible private good. Bidder 1 has the random use value θ˜1 ∈ [0, 1] for the good.
Let F denote the distribution function for θ˜1. We assume that F has a density f that is
positive and continuous on [0, 1] and is identically 0 elsewhere. Bidder 2 has the commonly
known use value θ2 = 0. We call bidder 2 a speculator.
We consider a 2-period interaction. Before period 1, bidder 1 privately learns the real-
ization of her use value, θ˜1 = θ1. In period 1, the good is offered via a sealed-bid first-price
auction or second-price auction without reserve price. The highest bidder becomes the new
owner of the good. To simplify the presentation we assume that bidder 1 wins all ties. The
period-1 winner either consumes the good in period 1 or makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in
period 2; if she fails to resell the good she consumes it in period 2. Period-2 payoffs are
discounted according to a common factor δ ∈ (0, 1).5
Actions taken in period 2 may depend on information that is revealed during period 1. In
the first-price case we assume that the winner’s bid becomes public after the auction while the
loser’s bid remains private. In the second-price auction case, we assume that the loser’s bid
becomes public while the winner’s bid remains private. These bid revelation assumptions
5The equilibria we construct remain valid without discounting (δ = 1), but it seems worthwhile to
emphasize that the constructions are robust to discounting. The only instance where we actually use the
discounting assumption δ < 1 is in the equilibrium uniqueness proof in the first-price auction setting.
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make the first-price auction strategically equivalent to a Dutch auction (which stops at
the moment the winner’s bid is revealed) and make the second-price auction strategically
equivalent to an English auction (which stops at the moment the loser’s bid is revealed).
We will say that the speculator plays an active role if she wins the auction in period 1
with positive probability.
3 First-price/Dutch auctions with resale
In this section we construct and discuss the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a first-price
auction with resale. Additional notation is required. Let β1 denote bidder 1’s bid as a
function of her use value and H denote the probability distribution for bidder 2’s (possibly
randomized) bid b˜2. The probability distribution Π(· | b2) describes bidder 2’s post-auction
belief about bidder 1’s use value if bidder 2 bids b2 and wins. T (b2) denotes bidder 2’s resale
offer. For all bids b1 ≥ 0 and θ1 ∈ [0, 1], bidder 1’s payoff is
u1(b1, θ1) = H(b)(θ1 − b1) + δ
∫
(b1,∞)
1θ1≥T (b)(θ1 − T (b))dH(b). (1)
For all bids b2 ≥ 0, bidder 2’s payoff is
u2(b2) = Pr[β1(θ˜1) < b2](−b2 + (1− Π−(T (b2) | b2))δT (b2)), (2)
where Π−(p | b2) = limp′↗pΠ(p′ | b2) (for all p ≥ 0) denotes the posterior probability that
bidder 1’s use value is less than p. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium conditions are Bayes rule
(3), optimality of the resale offer (4), and optimal bidding (5, 6), as shown in the following
Definition 1 A tuple (β1, H, T,Π) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the first-price auc-
tion with resale if
∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], b2 ≥ 0 :
Π(θ1 | b2) Pr[β1(θ˜1) < b2] = Pr[θ˜1 ≤ θ1, β1(θ˜1) < b2], (3)
∀b2 ≥ 0 : T (b2) ∈ argmax
p≥0
(1− Π−(p | b2))p, (4)
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∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1] : β1(θ1) ∈ argmax
b1≥0
u1(b1, θ1), (5)
Pr[b˜2 ∈ argmax
b≥0
u2(b)] = 1, (6)
where b˜2 is distributed according to H.
Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium. Condition (7) says that the bid of any bidder-1
type θ1 equals the discounted profit of a monopolist who faces the bidder-1 types in [0, θ1].
Bidder 2 randomizes her bid according to (8), in which the distribution H is constructed
such that bidder 1’s bid function is optimal. In particular, the support of H equals bidder
1’s bid range [0, β1(1)].
6 The resale offer function (10) follows from the post-auction beliefs
(9): if bidder 2 wins then she believes that the highest losing type of bidder 1 is the type
that would have resulted in a tie.
Proposition 1 A tuple (β1, H, T,Π) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the first-price
auction with resale if and only if conditions (7) (8), (9), and (10) hold.
∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1] : β1(θ1) = δmax
p≥0
F (θ1)− F (p)
F (θ1)
p. (7)
∀b2 ∈ (0, β1(1)] : H(b2) = e−
∫ β1(1)
b2
1
(1−δ)φ1(b)−b+δT (b)db, (8)
where φ1 denotes the inverse of β1.
∀b2 ≥ 0, θ1 ∈ [0, 1] : Π(θ1 | b2) = min{ F (θ1)
F (φ1(b2))
, 1}, (9)
6The feature that the private-value bidder (bidder 1) uses a strictly increasing bid function while an
additional bidder with no private information (bidder 2) randomizes her bid already appears in Vickrey (1961,
Appendix III). He constructs an equilibrium for first-price auctions without resale in a 2-bidder environment
where one bidder has a private uniformly distributed valuation and the other has a commonly known strictly
positive valuation. The structure of Vickrey’s equilibrium differs from ours in important respects. First,
the winning probability of Vickrey’s commonly-known-value bidder tends to 0 as her valuation tends to 0,
while the speculator wins with a positive probability although her use value equals 0. Second, Vickrey’s
commonly-known-value bidder obtains a strictly positive equilibrium payoff while the speculator obtains 0.
Third, in Vickrey’s equilibrium the private-value bidder wins the auction with probability 0 if her valuation
is sufficiently close to 0, while in our equilibrium every non-zero type wins with positive probability.
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where we define φ1(b2) = 1 for all b2 > β1(1).
∀b2 ≥ 0 : T (b2) ∈ argmax
p≥0
p(F (φ1(b2))− F (p)). (10)
Several properties of the equilibrium are worth mentioning. First, the equilibrium is
essentially unique.7 In particular, there exists no equilibrium where the speculator is not
active. Second, although the speculator plays an active role, speculation is not profitable:
bidder 2’s payoff equals 0 because bidder 1’s bid function (7) is such that, for all bids b in
the range of bidder 1’s bid function, bidder 2’s discounted resale profit equals b if she bids b.
Third, the final allocation is inefficient with positive probability, even in the limit δ → 1.8
The reason is that, because the losing bid remains private, bidder 1 retains some private
information when she enters the resale market, so that with positive probability the resale
offer is unacceptably high.9 Because in the absence of a resale opportunity the allocation
would be efficient, we obtain the conclusion that a resale opportunity can be detrimental to
efficiency.
The proof of Proposition 1 can be summarized as follows. The core step is to show that
in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium bidder 2’s payoff equals 0. Bidder 2’s payoff is, for each
possible bid, determined by the set of bidder-1 types against which the bid wins. Hence,
the 0-payoff condition for bidder 2 determines a unique strictly increasing bid function for
7If condition (10) is satisfied for two functions T = T ′ and T = T ′′ then Pr[T ′(b˜2) = T ′′(b˜2)] = 1, where
b˜2 denotes a random variable with distribution H. This follows because Edlin and Shannon’s (1998) strict
monotone comparative statics techniques show that the argmax-correspondence from which T is selected in
(10) is strictly increasing and thus its set of points of multiple-valuedness is countable (and thus has measure
0 according to H).
8An inefficiency would also occur in an model without resale if bidder 2 had a commonly known strictly
positive use value, but the equilibrium outcome would still be qualitatively different from that of Proposition
1; cf. footnote 6.
9This is not saying that the final allocation would be efficient if the losing bid were revealed. Krishna
(2002, Section 4.4) considers first-price auctions with two asymmetric private-value bidders where the loser’s
bid is revealed and the winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. Krishna shows that the
anticipation of resale prevents bidders from using strictly increasing bid functions. Thus, bidders retain
some private information when they enter the resale market.
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bidder 1. Finally, there exists a unique bid distribution for bidder 2 such that no bidder-1
type wants to deviate from her bid.
Lemma 1 contains the main insight towards establishing the 0-profit claim for bidder 2.
The lemma shows that bidder 2 makes, with positive probability, arbitrarily small bids. If
bidder 2’s bid distribution has an atom at the infimum bid b, the proof is as follows. Suppose
that b > 0. Because no bidder-1 type bids higher than her use value, the bid b > 0 wins with
positive probability. Hence, to avoid expected losses for bidder 2 the resale price T (b) must
exceed b/δ, and there must exist some bidder-1 types greater than T (b) who are overbid by
bidder 2’s bid b in the auction and accept the resale price T (b). For these bidder-1 types it
is profitable to deviate to a bid slightly above b. In doing so, they win against bidder 2’s
bid b and avoid the higher discounted resale price δT (b)—a contradiction. If bidder 2’s bid
distribution has no atom at b the proof is similar, but some limit arguments are needed; the
details can be found in the proof below.
Lemma 1 A tuple (β1, H, T,Π) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the first-price auction
with resale only if H(b) > 0 for all b > 0.
Proof. As a preliminary step, observe that a bidder-1 type who wins with positive
probability will not bid above her use value because she cannot resell the good at any
positive price,
∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], H(β1(θ1)) > 0 : β1(θ1) ≤ θ1. (11)
Let b = inf{b | H(b) > 0}. Suppose that b > 0. Let U2 ≥ 0 denote bidder 2’s equilibrium
payoff.
Suppose that H(b) = 0; i.e., no atom at b (the case H(b) > 0 is treated in the text
above). Let Θ = {θ1 | β1(θ1) ≤ b}. By (11),
[0, b] ⊆ Θ. (12)
For all b > b with u2(b) = U2,
0 ≤ u2(b) = Pr[β1(θ˜1) < b]
(
−b+ Pr[θ˜1 ≥ T (b) | β1(θ˜1) < b] δT (b)
)
.
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By (12), Pr[β1(θ˜1) < b] > 0, hence
∀b > b, u2(b) = U2 : Pr[θ˜1 ≥ T (b) | β1(θ˜1) < b] δT (b) > b. (13)
Therefore, T (b) > b and thus
Pr[θ˜1 < T (b) | β1(θ˜1) < b] ≥ Pr[θ˜1 < b | β1(θ˜1) < b]
(12)
≥ Pr[θ˜1 < b] = F (b).
Defining ξ = 1− F (b) < 1 and using (13), we find
∀b > b, u2(b) = U2 : ξδT (b) > b. (14)
Let (bm)
m∈IN be any sequence such that b
m → b as m → ∞, and u2(bm) = U2 and bm > b
for all m. Because some type θm accepts the resale price T (bm), there exists a sequence
(θm)
m∈IN such that β1(θ
m) < bm and θm ≥ T (bm) for all m.
Fix a bid b1 ∈ (b, b/ξ). We now show that a deviation to bid b1 is profitable for type θm
if m is sufficiently large. Let m be so large that β1(θ
m) < b1. Then
u1(b1, θ
m)− u1(β1(θm), θm)
= H(b1)(θ
m − b1)−H(β1(θm))(θ1 − β1(θm))
−
∫
(β1(θm),b1]
1θm≥T (b)δ(θm − T (b))dH(b)
(14)
≥ H(b1)(θm − b1)−H(β1(θm))(θ1 − β1(θm))
−(δθm − b/ξ)(H(b1)−H(β1(θm)))
≥ (H(b1)−H(β1(θm))(b/ξ − b1)−H(β(θm))(θ1 − β1(θm)).
This implies u1(b1, θ
m) > u1(β1(θ
m), θm) for large m because H(β1(θ
m)) → 0 as m → ∞.
This contradicts (5). QED
We now provide the proof of Proposition 1.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We begin with the “only-if”-part. The first step is to show
that bidder 2’s payoff U2 = 0 in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary
that U2 > 0. By Lemma 1, arbitrarily small bids yield the positive payoff U2. Hence, a
positive mass of bidder-1 types must be bidding 0. But an argument similar to that in the
proof of Lemma 1 shows that for some of these types it is profitable to deviate to a small
positive bid—a contradiction.
Bidder 1’s bid function β1 is strictly increasing and continuous (so that it has a continuous
inverse φ1),
10 and every positive type bids lower than her use value (because she cannot sell
the good at any positive price). Hence, bidder 2’s post-auction beliefs Π satisfy (9) and her
resale price function T satisfies (10). Therefore, bidder 2’s payoff function (2) is given by
∀b2 ≥ 0 : u2(b2) = F (φ1(b2))
(
−b2 + δmax
p≥0
F (φ1(b2))− F (p)
F (φ1(b2))
p
)
. (15)
Bidder 2’s bid distributionH has the support [0, β1(1)].
11 By Berge’s Maximum Theorem,
u2 is continuous. Hence, any bid in the support of H yields the equilibrium payoff:
∀b2 ∈ [0, β1(1)] : u2(b2) = U2 = 0. (16)
Formula (7) is straightforward from (15) and (16).
Finally, H is determined by the condition that the bid function β1 is locally optimal. For
any b ∈ (0, β1(1)), consider the effect of a marginal bid increase of type θ1 = φ1(b). With
marginal probability H ′(b), she gains the auction winning payoff θ1 − b and loses the resale
payoff θ1 − T (b), and with her winning probability H(b) there is a marginal increase of her
auction payment. Therefore, her first-order condition is
0 =
∂u1
∂b
(b, θ1)
∣∣∣∣
θ1=φ1(b)
= H ′(b)(φ1(b)− b− δ(φ1(b)− T (b))−H(b). (17)
10All this follows from standard arguments. Using δ < 1 one shows that bidder 1’s payoff function (1)
has strictly increasing differences, hence β1 is weakly increasing. If β1 had a flat part, optimality of bidder
2’s bid distribution (6) would prevent her from making bids just below the flat part, which contradicts the
optimality of β1. If β1 had a jump, bidder 2 would also not bid in the resulting gap of bidder 1’s bid
distribution, which contradicts the optimal bidding condition (5) for types just above the jumping type.
11The upper end of the support is β1(1) because no bidder will bid higher than necessary to win for
sure. The lower end is 0 by Lemma 1. If the distribution had a gap, some bidder-1 type would be bidding
unnecessarily high.
10
This yields a differential equation forH which together with the boundary conditionH(β1(1)) =
1 has the unique solution (8). The above argument is incomplete because one cannot assume
that H is differentiable. However, revealed preference arguments for bidder 1 can be used
to show that H is Lipschitz continuous on [b′, β1(1)] for all b′ > 0, so that H is differentiable
almost everywhere and the above arguments go through.
The main step in the proof of the “if”-part of Proposition 1 is that bidder 1’s payoff
function (1) is quasi-concave so that bidder 1’s bid function (7) is globally optimal; the
proof is straightforward. QED
Remark 1: If the initial seller sets a small reserve price, the speculator still plays an
active role.12 Precisely, there is no equilibrium where the speculator does not play an active
role. To see this, consider a first-price auction with a reserve price r > 0 and suppose that
bidder 2 wins the auction with probability 0. This implies that she does not submit a bid of
r or greater because such a bid would win against bidder-1 types below r. Hence, no bidder-1
type will bid more than r. But then it is profitable for bidder 2 to deviate to a bid just
above r and win the auction, provided r is not too large. Hence, we have a contradiction.
Remark 2: The speculator still plays an active role if we extend the bidders’ preferences
by assuming a small bid preparation cost (to be paid simultaneously with submitting any
strictly positive bid). The argument is the same as with a small reserve price.
Remark 3: The equilibrium remains valid with free entry of multiple speculators: ab-
staining is optimal for a second speculator because she obtains the same zero payoff as bidder
2 from any bid in [0, β1(1)]. There also exist equilibria with multiple active speculators: bid-
der 1 still uses the bid function (7), and the distribution function for the maximum bid
among all speculators (including bidder 2) is given by (8).
12 A reserve price that is revenue maximizing in the absence of resale will shut out the speculator (because
this price exceeds the resale profit even if the speculator wins the initial auction for sure).
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Remark 4: The equilibrium construction of Proposition 1 can be extended to environ-
ments where bidder 2 has a known use value θ2 > 0. Two properties of the equilibrium are
worth emphasizing. First, the initial seller’s revenue is higher than in the absence of a resale
opportunity if δ is close to 1. Second, bidder 2’s payoff is strictly positive, but tends to 0
as δ → 1. To see the revenue claim, observe first that if a bidder-1 type below δθ2 wins the
auction then she will offer the good for resale to bidder 2 at price θ2. Hence, a Bertrand
argument shows that δθ2 is a lower bound for the winning bid in the auction. In the absence
of a resale opportunity (see Vickrey, 1961, Appendix III, for the construction of an equilib-
rium; cf. footnote 6) bidder 2’s highest equilibrium bid b < θ2. Hence an upper bound for
the winning bid is given by b < δθ2 if δ is close to 1. To see the second property mentioned
above, concerning bidder 2’s equilibrium payoff, one first uses an argument similar to that
of Lemma 1 to show that the lower end of bidder 2’s bid distribution b < θ2. Because with
bid b ∈ [δθ2, θ2] bidder 2 does not win against the types above b, bidder 2’s payoff cannot
exceed F (b)(θ2 − b). On the other hand, the expression F (b)(θ2 − b) is a lower bound for
bidder 2’s payoff with any bid b ∈ [δθ2, θ2] because the bidder-1 types above δθ2 will not bid
higher than their use values. Hence, bidder 2’s payoff equals maxb∈[δθ2,θ2] F (b)(θ2− b), which
is positive and tends to 0 as δ → 1.
4 Second-price/English auctions with resale
In this section we construct and discuss a continuum of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equi-
libria for second-price auctions with resale where the speculator plays an active role. Here,
β1 denotes bidder 1’s bid as a function of her use value and bˆ2 denotes bidder 2’s bid (in
contrast to the first-price auction setting, we do not consider randomized bidding of the
speculator because it is not needed for the equilibrium construction). For any bidder-1 bid
b1 ≥ 0, the probability distribution Π(· | b1) describes bidder 2’s post-auction beliefs about
bidder 1’s use value if bidder 2 wins at price b1. T (b1) denotes bidder 2’s resale offer. For all
12
b1 ≥ 0 and θ1 ∈ [0, 1], bidder 1’s payoff is
u1(b1, θ1) =

θ1 − bˆ2 if b1 ≥ bˆ2,
δ(θ1 − T (b1)) if b1 < bˆ2, T (b1) ≤ θ1,
0 if b1 < bˆ2, T (b1) > θ1.
For all bids b2 ≥ 0, bidder 2’s payoff is
u2(b2) = E
[
−β1(θ˜1)1b2>β1(θ˜1) + δT (β1(θ˜1))1b2>β1(θ˜1), θ˜1≥T (β1(θ˜1))
]
. (18)
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium conditions are Bayes rule (19), optimality of the resale
offer (20), and optimal bidding (21, 22), as shown in the following
Definition 2 A tuple (β1, bˆ2, T,Π) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the second-price
auction with resale if
∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], b1 ≥ 0 :
∫
[0,b1]
Π(θ1 | b)dG(b) = Pr[θ˜1 ≤ θ1, β1(θ˜1) ≤ b1], (19)
where G denotes the distribution function for β1(θ˜1),
∀b1 ≥ 0 : T (b1) ∈ argmax
p≥0
(1− Π−(p | b1))p, (20)
where Π−(p | b1) = limp′↗pΠ(p′ | b1) denotes the posterior probability that bidder 1’s use
value is less than p,
∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1] : β1(θ1) ∈ argmax
b1≥0
u1(b1, θ1), (21)
and
bˆ2 ∈ argmax
b2≥0
u2(b2). (22)
Proposition 2 describes the equilibria. Bidder 1’s bid function (23) is such that all types
below some fixed parameter θ∗ pool at the bid 0 (or, equivalently, abstain from the auction)
while the types above θ∗ bid their use values. In particular, in equilibrium bidder 1 does not
make a bid in (0, θ∗).13 Bidder 2’s bid (24) lies in (0, θ∗) and is such that the bidder-1 type
13The shape of bidder 1’s bid function—a pool of low types, a gap in the bid distribution, and above
that a strictly increasing segment—resembles the symmetric equilibrium bid functions derived in Jehiel and
13
θ∗ is indifferent between overbidding bidder 2 and waiting for a resale offer. Bidder 2’s resale
offer function (25) follows from her post-auction beliefs (26). If bidder 2 wins at price 0 she
believes that bidder 1’s type is chosen from [0, θ∗]; if bidder 2 wins at a price in (θ∗, 1] she
believes that bidder 1’s type equals the auction price; if bidder 2 wins at an off-equilibrium
price in (0, θ∗) she believes that bidder 1’s type equals θ∗.14
Proposition 2 For every θ∗ ∈ [0, 1], the second-price auction with resale has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (β1, bˆ2, T,Π) with the properties (23), (24), (25), and (26).
β1(θ1) =
 0 if θ1 ∈ [0, θ∗),θ1 if θ1 ∈ (θ∗, 1]. (23)
bˆ2 = θ
∗ − δ (θ∗ − T (0)) . (24)
For all b1 ∈ [0, 1],
T (b1) =

∈ argmaxp≥0 p(F (θ∗)− F (p)) if b1 = 0,
θ∗ if b1 ∈ (0, θ∗),
b1 if b1 ∈ (θ∗, 1].
(25)
For all θ1 ∈ [0, 1] and b1 ∈ [0, 1],
Π(θ1 | b1) =

min{F (θ1)/F (θ∗), 1} if b1 = 0 and θ∗ > 0,
1θ1≥θ∗ if b1 ∈ (0, θ∗),
1θ1≥b1 if b1 ∈ (θ∗, 1].
(26)
Moldovanu (2000) and Haile (2000) for second-price auctions with a binding reserve price in environments
with positive externalities (such as the externalities arising from resale markets with complete information).
In these models, the size of the pool is determined by a trade-off arising from the fact that the positive
externality vanishes if the initial seller keeps the good. In particular, in contrast to our model, there is no
pooling in the absence of a reserve price, and there is no continuum of possible equilibrium pool sizes.
14The equilibrium with θ∗ = 1 is similar in spirit to an equilibrium constructed by Zheng (2000, Section
5.2) for an optimal auction a la Myerson (1981) with two private-value bidders. According to Zheng’s
construction, one bidder, if her use value is sufficiently high submits a high bid that wins for sure, and
otherwise she abstains. The other bidder bids the reserve price if her use value is sufficiently high and
otherwise she abstains. Zheng emphasizes that according to his equilibrium the resale opportunity reduces
the initial seller’s revenue.
14
Several properties of the equilibria of Proposition 2 are worth emphasizing. First, equi-
libria where the speculator plays an active role (θ∗ > 0) coexist with an equilibrium where
both bidders bid their use values so that no active resale market arises (θ∗ = 0). Second,
speculation is profitable in any equilibrium with θ∗ > 0 because the speculator wins at price 0
and sells at a positive price. In fact, Proposition 2 shows that any speculator payoff between
0 and δmaxp≥0 p(1 − F (p)) is supported by an equilibrium. Third, the final allocation is
inefficient with positive probability in any equilibrium with θ∗ > 0, even in the limit δ → 1.
The inefficiency arises because the losing bidder-1 types pool at the same bid, which implies
that bidder 1 retains some private information when she enters the resale market. Forth,
bidder 1’s equilibrium strategy is not weakly dominated, and bidder 2’s equilibrium strategy
is not weakly dominated if δ is sufficiently close to 1. In particular, if δ > bˆ2 then bidder 2’s
equilibrium strategy is not dominated by a strategy where she makes a bid b′2 < bˆ2 (bidder-1
types close to 1 may bid just below bˆ2, in which case bidder 2’s profit conditional on winning
at a price just below bˆ2 approximates δ − bˆ2 > 0).15
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward. No bidder-1 type profits from a deviation
to a bid in (0, bˆ2) because, by the off-equilibrium beliefs defined in (26), the deviation leads
to the high resale price θ∗ rather than the resale price T (0) < θ∗ that results from bidding
0.16 By (24), all bidder-1 types below θ∗ prefer bidding 0 and waiting for a resale offer to
overbidding bidder 2. The bidder-1 types above θ∗ have the opposite preference. For bidder
2 any bid in (0, θ∗] is equally good because she wins at price 0; it is harmful to bid higher
15The second-price auction without resale also has a continuum of equilibria parameterized by θ∗ where
bidder 1 uses a bid function β1 satisfying (23) and bidder 2 submits the bid θ∗, but the equilibria with θ∗ > 0
are in weakly dominated strategies and they break down if an arbitrarily small reserve price is introduced
(cf. Remark 5). See Blume and Heidhues (2001, 2004) for a characterization of the entire set of equilibria
of the second-price auction without resale in environments with independent private values having identical
support, and for a proof that only the bid-your-value equilibrium remains if an arbitrarily small reserve price
is introduced.
16The off-path beliefs defined in (26) satisfy the intuitive criterion. There exist beliefs different from (26)
that also support our equilibria. For example, the off-equilibrium beliefs could be identical to bidder 2’s
beliefs when she wins at price 0 (this was suggested to us by Bill Zame). More generally, our equilibria are
supported by any off-equilibrium beliefs that lead to a resale price greater than or equal to T (0).
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than θ∗ because in the event that bidder 2 needs such a high bid in order to win, she must
sell at a price equal to her auction payment.
Remark 5: If the initial seller sets a reserve price that is not too large, equilibria with
sufficiently large parameters θ∗ remain valid.17 More precisely, with reserve price r the
equilibria such that maxp≥0 p(F (θ∗)− F (p)) ≥ rF (θ∗) remain valid.
Remark 6: The equilibria remain essentially valid if we extend the bidders’ preferences
by assuming a small bid preparation cost (to be paid when submitting a strictly positive
bid). In fact, such costs would add additional stability to our equilibria because the bidder-1
types below the resale price T (0), who in the absence of bid preparation costs are indifferent
between bidding 0 and bidding, say, their values, would find it strictly optimal to bid 0.
Remark 7: The equilibria remain valid with free entry of multiple speculators. A second
speculator can conceivably make a profit only if she overbids bidder 2’s bid bˆ2. Her best hope
is a bid in the interval (bˆ2, θ
∗] (if she needs a bid above θ∗ in order to win, the highest use
value in the market does not exceed her payment in the auction). Any such bid yields a
resale revenue smaller than T (0), and hence smaller than bˆ2, showing that she would make
a loss.
Remark 8: The equilibrium construction of Proposition 2 can be extended to environ-
ments where bidder 2 has a known use value θ2 > 0. For every θ
∗ > θ2 and δ sufficiently close
to 1, there exists like before an equilibrium where all bidder-1 types above θ∗ bid their use
values and all types below θ∗ submit losing bids. The reason this equilibrium construction
breaks down for small discount factors δ is that it would optimal for bidder 2 to consume
the good upon winning.
17If a reserve price that is revenue maximizing in the absence of resale is set, all equilibria with θ∗ > 0
break down. The argument is similar to the first-price auction setting, cf. footnote 12.
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Remark 9: Final allocation and initial seller revenue differ across standard auction
formats.18 Precisely, none of the equilibria of Proposition 2 for second-price and English
auctions with resale yields the same final allocation (and only one yields the same revenue)
as the equilibrium of Proposition 1 for a first-price or Dutch auction with resale. According
to the equilibrium of Proposition 1, every non-zero bidder-1 type wins the initial auction
with positive probability. But in every θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ > 0, bidder 2’s resale price
is positive, so that any sufficiently small bidder-1 type obtains the good with probability 0,
and if θ∗ = 0 the allocation is efficient.
5 Extension to multiple private-value bidders
This section summarizes the extension of our model to environments with multiple symmet-
ric independent private value bidders (henceforth called regular bidders) and a speculator.
Details can be found in an online supplement. The main additional assumptions are that
the value distribution F for the regular bidders has an increasing hazard rate, and that we
focus on equilibria such that all regular bidders use the same bid function that is strictly
increasing in the winning range and such that all bidders who expect to win with probability
0 bid 0. Concerning resale mechanisms we cover two possibilities: the resale seller may use
any standard auction with an optimal reserve price, or she may be a mechanism designer
who uses an optimal mechanism.
The basic result that a speculator can play an active role and cause a distortion of the
final allocation in any standard auction remains valid, although in the case of first-price and
Dutch auctions this will depend on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the
discount factor. The result that a speculator can make profits in second-price and English
auctions, but not in a first-price or Dutch auction, also remains true.
18The failure of allocation equivalence contrasts earlier comparisons of standard auction formats with resale
such as Haile (2003), where the focus is mainly on revenue comparisons because appropriate assumptions
about the environment and the equilibria usually guarantee that the final allocation is efficient and hence
identical across auction formats.
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It is particularly instructive to understand why the speculator can play an active role
in a first-price or Dutch auction with any number n ≥ 2 of regular bidders.19 Consider a
distribution F such that, except at points close to 1, the density is that of an exponential
distribution; i.e., F (θ) = 1− e−zθ, for some z ∈ (0, 1). When the point 1 is approached, the
density suddenly peaks. Such a distribution has a constant hazard rate up to values close
to 1, but then the hazard rate increases sharply. Suppose that the speculator does not play
an active role. Then all regular bidders use the standard no-resale equilibrium bid function
βI. To obtain a contradiction we show that if the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to 1,
a profitable deviation for the speculator is to bid βI(1) in the auction and offer the good at
a price just below 1 in the resale market. The argument is as follows. By definition of βI,
the bid βI(1) equals the expectation of the distribution F n−1, which approximates
η(z, n) = (n− 1)1
z
∫ z
0
τe−τ (1− e−τ )n−2dτ + 1− (1− e−z)n−1. (27)
The resale revenue approximates the probability that at least one bidder has a use value
close to 1,
ρ(z, n) = 1− (1− e−z)n. (28)
Using the Taylor expansion for e−z, one finds that for z ≈ 0, ρ(z, n) = 1 − zn + O(zn) and
η(z, n) = 1 − 1
n
zn−1 + O(zn−1).20 Therefore, ρ(z, n) > η(z, n) for small z. Hence, when the
discount factor is close to 1, the bid βI(1) is profitable for the speculator, a contradiction to
the claim that the speculator does not play an active role.
A question that arises specifically in environments with multiple regular bidders is whether
the presence of a resale opportunity increases or decreases initial seller revenue (the answer
is trivial in environments with a single regular bidder because in the absence of resale the
revenue is zero). Concerning first-price and Dutch auctions, the answer is that resale never
reduces initial seller revenue, and strictly increases it if the speculator plays an active role.
In a second-price or English auction a resale opportunity may strictly increase or decrease
19It is easy to find examples where the speculator does not play an active role. The uniform distribution
F together with any discount factor δ and any n ≥ 2 will do.
20We use the notation O(zl) for any function (z) with the property (z)/zl → 0 as z → 0.
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initial seller revenue: equilibria with a low winning probability of the speculator correspond
to a revenue increase, while equilibria with a high winning probability of the speculator
correspond to a revenue decrease.
A final result is that the presence of a resale opportunity can decrease initial seller revenue
in second-price and English auctions in an extended game where the initial seller can set
an arbitrary reserve price for the initial auction. This result is important because it shows
that the impact of a resale opportunity on initial seller revenue does not always vanish in
environments where both the initial seller and the resale seller have access to the same class
of sales mechanisms (second-price or English auctions with arbitrary reserve prices).
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Supplement to
“Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale”
By Rod Garratt and Thomas Tro¨ger
May 4, 2005
Abstract
We extend the model presented in the Note “Speculation in Standard Auctions with
Resale” by the same authors to environments with multiple symmetric independent-
private-value bidders and prove the results stated in Section 5 of the Note.
Keywords: standard auctions, speculation, resale, efficiency
JEL code: D44
In Section 1, we extend the model from Garratt and Tro¨ger (2005), subsequently referred
to as the Note, to environments with multiple private-value bidders. Section 2 deals with
first-price and Dutch auctions. Section 3 is devoted to second-price auctions. Section 4
explains that the second-price auction results remain valid for English auctions.
1
1 Extending the model to multiple private-value bid-
ders
We consider environments with n ≥ 2 risk-neutral bidders i = 1, . . . , n, called regular bidders,
who are interested in consuming a single indivisible private good, and an additional risk-
neutral bidder s called the speculator. Let I = {1, . . . , n}. Let θ˜i ∈ [0, 1] denote the use
value of bidder i ∈ I for the good, and let θ˜s = θs = 0 denote the speculator’s use value
for the good. For all i ∈ I ∪ {s}, let θ˜(1)−i = maxj∈I\{i} θ˜j denote the random variable
for the highest use value among bidders other than i. The random variables θ˜1, . . . , θ˜n
are stochastically independent, and each θ˜i (i ∈ I) is distributed according to the same
distribution F . We assume that F has a density f that is positive and continuous on [0, 1]
and identically 0 elsewhere. Because each bidder privately learns her realized use value
before the interaction begins we say, following Vickrey (1961), that the bidders 1, . . . , n are
symmetric with independent private values (SIPV). We make the standard assumption that
F has a weakly increasing hazard rate.
Assumption 1 The mapping θ 7→ f(θ)/(1− F (θ)) is weakly increasing on [0, 1).
We consider a 2-period interaction. In period 1, the good is offered via a sealed-bid first-
price auction or second-price auction without reserve price (our analysis extends to English
and Dutch auctions, see below). The highest bidder becomes the new owner of the good.
Our results do not depend on the tieing rule, but to simplify some proofs we assume that
the speculator loses all ties. The bidder who wins in period 1 either consumes the good in
period 1 or offers the good for resale in period 2; if she fails to resell the good she consumes
it in period 2. Period-2 payoffs are discounted according to a common factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Modelling Period 1—the auction
Because our focus is on the impact of the speculator, and the regular bidders are ex ante
identical, we will focus on equilibria such that all regular bidders use the same bid function
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β in period 1. This bid function is assumed to be strictly increasing in the winning range
(this simplifies the computation of post-auction beliefs). Moreover, any regular-bidder type
who does not expect to ever win the auction does not participate (formally, we assume such
a type bids 0, but we will show that with bid 0 she never wins).1
Assumption 2 In equilibrium, all regular bidders use the same bid function β in period 1.
For all θ, θ′ ∈ [0, 1] with θ > θ′, we have β(θ) > β(θ′) if the bid β(θ′) wins in equilibrium
with positive probability, and have β(θ′) = 0 otherwise.
For later use, let us introduce some notation for random vectors of bids and highest
order statistics. For all i ∈ I, let b˜i = β(θ˜i) denote the random variable for i’s bid. Let b˜s
denote an independent random variable for the speculator’s, possibly randomized, bid. For
all i ∈ I ∪ {s}, let b˜−i = (b˜j)j∈(I∪{s})\{i} denote the random vector of bids by bidders other
than i, and let b˜
(1)
−i = maxj∈(I∪{s})\{i} b˜j denote the random variable for the highest among
these bids. For all i, j ∈ I ∪ {s}, let b˜−i−j = (b˜k)k∈(I∪{s})\{i,j} denote the random vector of
bids by bidders other than i and j, and let b˜
(1)
−i−j = maxk∈(I∪{s})\{i,j} b˜k denote the random
variable for the highest among these bids.
The next assumption extends the bid revelation assumptions from the Note.
Assumption 3 After a first-price auction the winner’s bid becomes public; the losers’ bids
remain private.
After a second-price auction, the losers’ bids become public; the winner’s bid remains
private.
These bid revelation assumptions make the first-price auction setting strategically equiv-
alent to the Dutch auction setting. Concerning the second-price auction, the bid revelation
assumptions are such that after the auction the same information is revealed as after an
1As for further regularity properties of the bid function β, note that we will construct equilibria in the
second-price auction case where β is not continuous. In the first-price auction case, there will be a unique
equilibrium, where β is always continuous, but not necessarily differentiable.
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English auction. In Section 4 we will show that our second-price auction results remain
valid in the English auction setting.2
By Assumption 3, all bidders make the same bid observations. It is thus reasonable to
assume that any two bidders have identical post-auction beliefs about a third bidder even
if an unexpected event occurs so that Bayesian updating is not possible, and to assume
that it is commonly believed that all bidders have these beliefs. Moreover, it is reasonable
to maintain stochastic independence of the post-auction beliefs across bidders because use
values are stochastically independent ex ante. Hence, given any auction outcome, we can
assume that post-auction beliefs are summarized by a vector of distributions Π = (Πj)j∈I ,
where Πj represents the post-auction belief about bidder j’s use value. Note that Π includes
the beliefs about the resale seller’s use value unless the resale seller is the speculator.
The post-auction beliefs that occur in our equilibrium constructions are represented by
distributions of the following kind. For any θ, θ ∈ [0, 1] such that θ ≤ θ, consider a bidder
who infers from the observed bidding behavior in period 1 that bidder i’s (i ∈ I) use value
belongs to the interval [θ, θ]. According to Bayes rule, the resulting posterior distribution
function Fˆ[θ,θ] for bidder i’s use value is given by
Fˆ[θ,θ](θi) =

F (θi)−F (θ)
F (θ)−F (θ) if θi ∈ [θ, θ),
1 if θi ≥ θ,
0 if θi < θ.
Note that Fˆ[θ,θ] is a point distribution if θ = θ. If θ > θ, the distribution Fˆ[θ,θ] has (on its
support [θ, θ]) the same regularity properties as F : a positive and continuous density and
an increasing hazard rate. By Assumption 2, the case θ > θ becomes relevant only if an
off-equilibrium bid or bid 0 is observed.
Modelling period 2—the resale market
2In the second-price auction setting, we expect that our equilibria remain valid even if the initial seller
does not announce any information about the bids. This is because in the equilibria that we will construct,
the only dependence of the outcome of the resale market on the auction bids is via the highest loser bid, and
in a second-price auction the auction winner learns the highest loser bid from the price she pays.
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The period-2 environment where resale takes place is determined by the identity i ∈
I ∪ {s} and use value θi of the resale seller (i.e., the auction winner) and by the post-
auction beliefs Π = (Πj)j∈I . Any tuple (Π, θi, i) is called a resale environment. A resale
mechanism is a game form to be played in period 2 with players I∪{s}, where an outcome is
a probability distribution over who gets the good and a vector of side payments among the
players, together with an equilibrium such that the participation constraints are satisfied;
if multiple equilibria exist, we assume an equilibrium that is best for the resale seller is
played. A resale mechanism is called optimal if there exists no other resale mechanism that
yields a higher expected payoff for the resale seller. For any resale environment (Π, θi, i), let
Mˆ(Π, θi, i) denote the resale mechanism used.
Assumption 4 For all resale environments (Π, θi, i) where every standard auction with an
optimal reserve price is an optimal resale mechanism, the resale mechanism Mˆ(Π, θi, i) is a
standard auction with an optimal reserve price.
Observe that, according to this assumption, in any resale environment where not all four
standard auctions are optimal, any resale mechanism may be used. Hence, Assumption 4
covers two important special cases: the resale seller may always use any standard auction
with an optimal reserve price,3 or she may always use an optimal resale mechanism.4 The
first case is attractive because the cost of implementing a standard auction is negligible in
many applications. The second case is attractive because it allows the resale seller to be
3Strictly speaking, an optimal reserve price may not always exist (because post-auction beliefs may be
represented by non-smooth distributions). In such a resale environment, Assumption 4 allows any resale
mechanism to be used. In particular, a standard auction with any reserve price that is arbitrarily close to
being optimal may be used.
4If an optimal resale mechanism does not exist the resale seller may use any resale mechanism that is
arbitrarily close to being optimal. Observe that, due to independent private values in the resale market, an
optimal resale mechanism exists and can by computed using Myerson’s (1981) methods as long as the resale
seller’s use value is commonly known and the beliefs about the other bidders are represented by smooth
distributions.
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fully rational concerning the choice of a resale mechanism if any mechanism can be costlessly
implemented.
The reason that Assumption 4 is sufficient for our results is that in the resale environments
that are relevant for our equilibrium constructions, any standard auction with an optimal
reserve price is an optimal resale mechanism. Other resale environments become relevant if
a bidder deviates from her equilibrium bid in an attempt to win the auction more often and
subsequently offer the good for resale, but we will show that even if the deviating bidder
appropriates the entire surplus in the resale market no such deviation is profitable.
Equilibrium resale environments
The following two classes of resale environments are relevant for our equilibrium con-
structions. (i) The resale environments where the resale seller is certain about the maximum
use value among all bidders. (ii) The resale environments where the resale seller is the spec-
ulator and, according to the post-auction beliefs, the n regular bidders have independent
private values, where each bidder’s value is distributed according to Fˆ[0,θˆ] for some θˆ ∈ (0, 1].
In class (i), any standard auction with a reserve price equal to the maximum use value is
an optimal resale mechanism because the resale seller appropriates the entire surplus. The
equilibrium resale allocation is that the resale seller keeps the good if she has the maximum
use value, and otherwise sells it to the bidder with the maximum use value. In class (ii), it is
well-known (cf. Myerson, 1981) that any standard auction with reserve price rˆ(θˆ) implicitly
defined by rˆ(θˆ) = (F (θˆ) − F (rˆ(θˆ)))/f(rˆ(θˆ)) is an optimal resale mechanism (observe that
the function rˆ is uniquely determined on (0, 1], and is strictly increasing and continuous).
The equilibrium resale allocation is that the bidder with the highest value obtains the good,
unless her value is below rˆ(θˆ), in which case the resale seller keeps the good. In both classes
(i) and (ii) of resale environments, we use the notation S(rˇ) to denote any standard auction
with any reserve price rˇ ≥ 0.
Throughout the rest of this section, we consider the resale environments of class (ii).
We derive auxiliary technical results about the resale mechanism S(rˆ(θˆ)) for all θˆ ∈ (0, 1].
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Denote by Pˆθˆ(θ) the expected payment of a regular bidder with use value θ ∈ [0, 1] in
the mechanism S(rˆ(θˆ)), and by Qˆθˆ(θ) the probability that the bidder obtains the good.5
Properties of the functions Pˆ and Qˆ are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider any θˆ ∈ (0, 1]. For all θ ∈ [0, rˆ(θˆ)), we have Pˆθˆ(θ) = 0 and Qˆθˆ(θ) = 0.
For all θ ∈ [rˆ(θˆ), θˆ],
Pˆθˆ(θ)
Qˆθˆ(θ)
= θ −
∫ θ
rˆ(θˆ)
F (θ′)n−1
F (θ)n−1
dθ′, (1)
Pˆθˆ(θ)
Qˆθˆ(θ)
is weakly increasing in θ and θˆ, (2)
Qˆθˆ(θ) = F (θ)
n−1/F (θˆ)n−1. (3)
For all θ ∈ [θˆ, 1],
Qˆθˆ(θ) = 1, Pˆθˆ(θ) = Pˆθˆ(θˆ). (4)
Proof. Formulas (1), (3), and (4) are standard. To see (2), use that rˆ is increasing and
the derivative of Pˆθˆ(θ)/Qˆθˆ(θ) with respect to θ is non-negative. QED
The resale seller’s expected revenue in the mechanism S(rˆ(θˆ)) is denoted M(θˆ); also let
M(0) = 0. Observe that M is strictly increasing. Other properties of M are summarized in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For all θˆ ∈ (0, 1],
M(θˆ) =
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
(
θ − F (θˆ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
d(F (θ)n)
F (θˆ)n
, (5)
M ′(θˆ) = n
f(θˆ)
F (θˆ)
(
θˆ −M(θˆ)−
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
F (θ)n−1
F (θˆ)n−1
dθ
)
. (6)
Moreover,
M ′(0) <
n− 1
n
. (7)
The function M is Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1], and its derivative M ′ is continuous.
5Observe that according to the post-auction beliefs the probability equals 0 that a bidder-type in (θˆ, 1]
participates in the resale market. It is nevertheless important to define the functions Pˆθˆ(θ) and Qˆθˆ(θ) for
θ > θˆ because a participation of a type θ > θˆ may arise from a deviation in period 1.
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Proof. Formula (5) is standard from Myerson (1981), while (6) follows from standard
differentiation rules. By differentiability, F (θ) = f(0)θ + O(θ). Using this and rˆ(θˆ)/θˆ → 1/2
as θˆ → 0, (5) can be used to show
M ′(0) = lim
θˆ→0
M(θˆ)
θˆ
=
n− 1
n+ 1
+
1
2n(n+ 1)
, (8)
which implies (7). Using (6) and (8), it can be confirmed that limθˆ→0M
′(θˆ) = M ′(0).
Therefore, M ′ is continuous on [0, 1]. Hence, M ′ is bounded above on [0, 1], which implies
Lipschitz continuity of M . QED
The final result in this section shows that the payment of the highest type of bidder who
participates in the resale market is higher than the resale seller’s expected revenue.
Lemma 3
∀θˆ ∈ (0, 1] : Pˆθˆ(θˆ) > M(θˆ). (9)
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we find
M(θˆ) = n
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
Pˆθˆ(θ)
dF (θ)
F (θˆ)
= n
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
Pˆθˆ(θ)
Qˆθˆ(θ)
Qˆθˆ(θ)
dF (θ)
F (θˆ)
(3)
=
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
Pˆθˆ(θ)
Qˆθˆ(θ)
dF (θ)n
F (θˆ)n
(2)
≤
∫ θˆ
rˆ(θˆ)
Pˆθˆ(θˆ)
Qˆθˆ(θˆ)
dF (θ)n
F (θˆ)n
(4)
= Pˆθˆ(θˆ)
(
1− F (rˆ(θˆ))
n
F (θˆ)n
)
< Pˆθˆ(θˆ)
because rˆ(θˆ) < θˆ. QED
Observe that Lemma 3 would be trivial if n = 1 because nobody would pay more than
the highest participating type. If n > 1, the expected payment of any given bidder type is
collected n times if all resale bidders have this type. The proof instead works with any given
type’s expected payment divided by her winning probability. Because this divided payment
is increasing in type and because with positive probability nobody wins, the highest type’s
divided payment exceeds the seller’s revenue. But the highest type wins for sure, which
completes the proof.
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2 The first-price/Dutch auction with resale
In this section we construct and discuss the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of a first-price auction with resale. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium. Proposition 2
deals with the question for which parameter constellations the speculator plays an active
role. Proposition 3 evaluates the impact of a resale opportunity on initial seller revenue.
Let β denote bidder i’s (i ∈ I) bid in the first-price auction as a function of her use value.
Let H denote the probability distribution for the speculator’s bid b˜s.
To define post-auction beliefs, consider any bidder j ∈ I. Let i ∈ I ∪{s} denote the label
of the winner, and let bi ≥ 0 denote the winner’s bid. Then, the probability distribution
Πj(· | i, bi) denotes the post-auction belief about j’s use value held by bidders other than j.
Let M(i, bi, θi) denote the resale mechanism used by the resale seller i ∈ I ∪ {s} after a
first-price auction when bi ≥ 0 denotes i’s auction winning bid and i’s use value is θi. For all
i, j ∈ I ∪ {s} with j 6= i, all bi ≥ 0, and all θi, θj, let Pj(i, bi, θi, θj) denote the net expected
transfer from bidder j of type θj to the other bidders (including the transfer to i) in the
mechanism M(i, bi, θi). Let Qj(i, bi, θi, θj) denote the probability that bidder j obtains the
good. Let P (i, bi, θi) denote the expected transfer to the resale seller i, and Q(i, bi, θi) the
probability that the resale seller keeps the good.
For all i ∈ I, bidder i’s expected payoff when she bids bi ≥ 0 and has the use value θi
equals
ui(bi, θi) = E[
(−bi +max{θi, δ (θiQ(i, bi, θi) + P (i, bi, θi))})1w(bi,b˜−i)=i
+
∑
j 6=i
δ
(
θiQi(j, b˜j, θ˜j, θi)− Pi(j, b˜j, θ˜j, θi)
)
1w(bi,b˜−i)=j ],
where w denotes the period-1 winner as a function of the bid profile, and where the max-term
reflects the condition that after winning in period 1 bidder i decides optimally whether to
consume the good or to offer it for resale. The speculator’s payoff when she bids bs ≥ 0 is
given by
us(bs) = E[(−bs + δP (s, bs, θs))1w(bs,b˜−s)=s ].
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The equilibrium conditions are (10) that post-auction beliefs about auction losers are deter-
mined by Bayes rule whenever possible, (11) that the resale mechanism is chosen according
to Assumption 4, and (12, 13) that period-1 behavior is optimal.
Definition 1 A tuple (β,H,M) is a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price
auction with resale if there exists a belief system
(Πj(· | i, bi))j∈I, i∈I∪{s}, bi≥0 such that the following holds:
∀i ∈ I ∪ {s}, bi > 0, j ∈ I \ {i} :
Πj(· | i, bi) = Fˆβ−1([0,bi]) if [0, bi] ∩ β([0, 1]) 6= ∅, (10)
∀i ∈ I ∪ {s}, bi ≥ 0, θi : M(i, bi, θi) = Mˆ((Πj(· | i, bi))j∈I , θi, i), (11)
∀i ∈ I, θi : β(θi) ∈ argmax
bi≥0
ui(bi, θi), (12)
Pr[b˜s ∈ argmax
bs≥0
us(bs)] = 1. (13)
This equilibrium concept is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, combined with
the symmetry and regularity restrictions formulated in Assumption 2, and with two presen-
tational simplifications. First, we have omitted a condition on the post-auction beliefs about
the auction winner because it would play no role for our analysis. Second, condition (10)
excludes the case bi = 0; the appropriate Bayesian updating condition for this case would
depend on the auction tieing rule (whereas, by Assumption 2, ties occur with probability 0
if bi > 0), but the case bi = 0 is irrelevant for our analysis because it will turn out that in
equilibrium only positive bids can win the auction with positive probability.
Additional notation is needed in order to state the main result, Proposition 1, which
describes the equilibrium. For all θ ∈ (0, 1] and b ∈ IR, define
K(θ, b) =
 N(θ, b) if b > δM(θ),max {δM ′(θ), N(θ, b)} if b ≤ δM(θ), (14)
where
N(θ, b) = (n− 1) f(θ)
F (θ)
(θ − b). (15)
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Observe that in a first-price auction with n regular bidders and without resale opportunity,
N(θ, b) is the slope of the equilibrium bid function at θ when b equals type θ’s equilibrium
bid. Hence, N(θ, b) represents the competition among the regular bidders in the absence
of resale. The function K(θ, b) equals N(θ, b) if b > δM(θ); that is, if b and θ are such
that, if resale is possible, a speculator who comes in with a bid of b and wins against the
regular-bidder types up to θ makes a loss. If type θ’s bid b is such that the speculator breaks
even (b = δM(θ)), then K(θ, b) is the larger of N(θ, b) and the slope δM ′(θ) that keeps the
speculator at the break-even point. In summary, K(θ, b) is the smallest slope that respects
the competition among the regular bidders without resale and does not allow the speculator
to make a profit via resale.
For any b > 0, consider a strictly increasing Lipschitz continuous function φ : [0, b]→ [0, 1]
such that φ(b) > b ≥ δM(φ(b)) for all b > 0. For all b ∈ (0, b] where the derivative φ′(b)
exists, define
Lφ(b) =

Rφ(b)
Sφ(b)
if b = δM(φ(b)),
0 if b > δM(φ(b)),
(16)
where
Rφ(b) = 1−N(φ(b), b)φ′(b), (17)
Sφ(b) = (1− δ)φ(b)− b+ δPˆφ(b)(φ(b)).
Observe that Lφ is well-defined because b = δM(φ(b)) implies Sφ(b) > 0 by (9). Also observe
that Lφ(b) = 0 if b is such that the speculator would make a loss if she did bid b and did win
against the types in [0, φ(b)].
Proposition 1 describes the unique equilibrium.6 Condition (18) establishes a differential
equation for the regular bidders’ bid function β. The differential equation, which holds almost
everywhere according to the Lebesgue measure, reflects the bidding competition among the
6The uniqueness property differs from the “essential uniqueness” in the Note where multiple optimal resale
prices cannot be excluded because value distributions F with a non-increasing hazard rate are allowed; cf.
footnote 1 in the Note and p. 7 in the Note.
11
regular bidders and a no-profit condition for the speculator (recall the properties of the
function K explained above). The speculator randomizes her bid according to (19), in which
the distribution H is constructed such that it is optimal for the regular bidders to use the
bid function defined by (18). Using (16) one sees that the support of H is confined to the
points θ where β(θ) = δM(θ) so that the speculator does not make a loss.7 The post-auction
beliefs (20) of the winning bidder are that the highest type among the losing regular bidders
is the type that would have resulted in a tie. Hence, if one of the regular bidders wins the
auction after making her equilibrium bid, she believes that she has the highest use value in
the market and thus consumes the good. Condition (21) states that if the auction winner is
the speculator, then her resale mechanism is a standard auction with a reserve price that is
optimal given her post-auction beliefs.
Proposition 1 For any regular-bidder number n ≥ 2, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and dis-
tribution F satisfying Assumption 1, the first-price auction with resale has a unique quasi-
symmetric regular equilibrium (β,H,M). The equilibrium satisfies conditions (18) (19), and
(21). It is supported by beliefs satisfying (20).
β is Lipschitz, β(0) = 0, β′(θ) = K(θ, β(θ)) a.e. θ ∈ (0, 1). (18)
∀b ∈ (0, β(1)] : H(b) = e−
∫ β(1)
b Lφ(b) db, (19)
where φ denotes the inverse of β.
∀i, bi ≥ 0, j 6∈ {s, i}, θj : Πj(θj | i, bi) = min{ F (θj)
F (φ(bi))
, 1}, (20)
where we define φ(bi) = 1 for all bi > β(1).
∀bs > 0 : M(s, bs, 0) = S(rˆ(φ(bs))). (21)
7The feature that the regular bidders use a strictly increasing bid function while an additional bidder with
no private information randomizes over a subset of the regular bidders’ bid range also appears in Martinez
(2002). She constructs an equilibrium for first-price auctions without resale in an environment with three
or more regular bidders and one additional bidder with a commonly known valuation. The differences
between Martinez’ equilibrium and ours are parallel to the differences between Vickrey’s (1961, Appendix
III) equilibrium and our equilibrium in the 2-bidder case; cf. footnote 6 in the Note.
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Proof. We first show uniqueness (Lemma 4 to Lemma 11), then existence (Lemma 12
to Lemma 15).
Lemma 4 shows that no regular bidder will bid above her value. Lemma 5 establishes a
convenient representation for the speculator’s payoff function. Lemma 6 shows that, with
positive probability, the speculator makes arbitrarily small bids. Lemma 7 shows that the
speculator’s equilibrium payoff equals 0. Lemma 8 shows that the speculator’s bid distri-
bution has no atoms. Lemma 9 states that the regular bidders’ equilibrium bid function
is continuous. Lemma 10 states that every regular bidder with a positive use value will
bid lower than her use value. Lemma 11 shows that the regular bidders’ equilibrium bid
function satisfies (18) and is uniquely characterized by (18), and the speculator’s bid distri-
bution is given by (19). Conditions (20) are (21) are then straightforward. This completes
the equilibrium uniqueness proof.
In Lemma 12 and Lemma 14, we apply techniques from the theory of differential inclu-
sions8 to show that the differential equation (18) has a solution. In doing this, we also recall
in Lemma 13 the differential equation satisfied by the standard no-resale first-price auction
equilibrium bid function. Lemma 15 completes the equilibrium existence proof.
For any bid function β satisfying Assumption 2 and all b ∈ [0, β(1)], let
φ(b) = sup{θi ∈ [0, 1] | β(θi) < b}, (22)
where sup ∅ = 0.
Lemma 4 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale, and let φ be defined by (22). Then β(θi) ≤ θi for all θi ∈ [0, 1], and φ(b) ≥ b for
all b ∈ [0, β(1)].
Proof. By Assumption 2, β(0) = 0. Now suppose that β(θi) > θi for some θi > 0.
In particular, β(θi) > 0 and thus β(θi) wins with positive probability by Assumption 2.
8We thank Jo¨rg Oechssler for help with this part of the proof.
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Therefore, H(β(θi)) > 0 and F (φ(β(θi)))
n−1 > 0. A deviation to the bid bi = θi is profitable
because
ui(θi, θi)− ui(β(θi), θi)
= H(β(θi))F (φ(β(θi)))
n−1(β(θi)− θi)
+δE
(θiQˆφ(b˜s)(θi)− Pˆφ(b˜s)(θi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i, θi<b˜s≤β(θi)

> 0.
To prove the second part of the lemma, fix b > 0 and consider any θi < b. Then β(θi) ≤
θi < b. Because θi is arbitrary, φ(b) ≥ b. QED
Lemma 5 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale, and let φ be defined by (22). Then,
∀b > 0, H(b) > 0 : us(b) = F (φ(b))n (δM(φ(b))− b) .
Proof. Consider any b > 0 such that H(b) > 0 and any θ′ < φ(b). It follows β(θ′) < b
(otherwise β(θ) ≥ b for all θ > θ′ by Assumption 2, implying φ(b) ≤ θ′). Hence, the set
{θ ∈ [0, 1] | β(θ) < b} equals [0, φ(b)) or [0, φ(b)]. QED
The following lemma shows that bidder 2 makes, with positive probability, arbitrarily
small bids. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 in the Note. One supposes that the
speculator’s infimum equilibrium bid b > 0. Then low regular-bidder types never win the
auction. For some of these types it is profitable to deviate to a bid slightly above b because,
combining (9) with a continuity argument, the deviating bid is smaller than the speculator’s
resale price.
Lemma 6 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale. Then H(b) > 0 for all b > 0.
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Proof. Let b = inf{b | H(b) > 0}. Suppose that b > 0. Let Us ≥ 0 denote the
speculator’s equilibrium payoff. First consider the case H(b) = 0 (i.e., no atom at b). Then
there exists a sequence (bm)
m∈IN such that b
m → b as m→∞, us(bm) = Us, and bm > b for
all m. By Lemma 5,
∀m : Us = F (φ(bm))n (δM(φ(bm))− bm) . (23)
By Lemma 4, φ(bm) > 0, hence (23) implies δM(φ(bm))− bm ≥ 0. Defining θ = limm φ(bm),
it follows δM(θ) ≥ b. This together with (9) implies
∃ξ > 0 : Pˆθ(θ) ≥M(θ) + ξ ≥ b
δ
+ ξ. (24)
Continuity of Pˆ by Lemma 1 together with (24) implies that there exists b′ > b and θ′ < θ
such that
∀b ∈ (b, b′) : Pˆφ(b)(θ′) ≥ b
δ
+
ξ
2
. (25)
Now consider any bidder i ∈ I with type θi = θ′. By construction, her equilibrium bid
bi = β(θ
′) never wins. Moreover, if some bidder j ∈ I \ {i} wins then bj = β(θj) > b ≥ bi,
implying θj > θ
′; i.e., bidder j will not resell to bidder i. Therefore, Qi(j, bj, θj, θ′) = 0 and
Pi(j, bj, θj, θ
′) = 0. Therefore,
ui(β(θ
′), θ′) = δE
[(
θ′Qˆφ(b˜s)(θ
′)− Pˆφ(b˜s)(θ′)
)
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i
]
.
On the other hand, for all bi > b,
ui(bi, θ
′) ≥ δE
[(
θ′Qˆφ(b˜s)(θ
′)− Pˆφ(b˜s)(θ′)
)
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i, b˜s>bi
]
+(θ′ − bi) Pr[b˜s > b˜(1)−s−i, b˜s ≤ bi].
Therefore, for all bi ∈ (b, b′),
ui(bi, θ
′)− ui(β(θ′), θ′) ≥ −δE
[(
θ′Qˆφ(b˜s)(θ
′)− Pˆφ(b˜s)(θ′)
)
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i, b˜s≤bi
]
+(θ′ − bi) Pr[b˜s > b˜(1)−s−i, b˜s ≤ bi]
≥ E
[(
δPˆφ(b˜s)(θ
′)− bi
)
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i, b˜s≤bi
]
(25)
≥ E
[(
b+
δξ
2
− bi
)
1
b˜s>b˜
(1)
−s−i, b˜s≤bi
]
=
(
b+
δξ
2
− bi
)
Pr[b˜s > b˜
(1)
−s−i, b˜s ≤ bi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥Pr[θ˜(1)−i<θ, b˜s≤bi]>0
.
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Hence, ui(bi, θ
′) > ui(β(θ′), θ′) for all bi > b that are sufficiently close to b. This contradicts
(12).
In the case H(b) > 0 the proof is similar. One defines θ = φ(b) and shows that the
deviation b1 = b is profitable for some type θ
′ < θ. QED
Lemma 7 In any quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction with resale,
the speculator’s payoff equals 0.
Proof. Let Us ≥ 0 denote the speculator’s equilibrium payoff. Suppose that Us > 0.
This implies H(0) = 0. Hence, by Lemma 6 there exists a sequence (bm)
m∈IN such that
bm → 0 as m→∞, us(bm) = Us, and bm > 0 for all m. By Lemma 5,
∀m : Us = F (φ(bm))n (δM(φ(bm))− bm) ≤M(φ(bm)).
Hence, M(θ) ≥ Us > 0, where θ ≡ limm φ(bm). Note that
∀θ < θ : β(θ) = 0. (26)
By (9), Pˆθ(θ) > Us. As in the proof of Lemma 6, continuity of Pˆ by Lemma 1 now shows
the existence of b′ > 0 and θ′ < θ such that
∀b ∈ (0, b′) : Pˆφ(b)(θ′) ≥ Us
2
.
Consider a bidder i ∈ I with type θi = θ′. By (26), her equilibrium bid β(θ′) = 0 never wins.
In the same manner as in the proof of Lemma 6, one obtains a contradiction by showing
that a deviation to a small positive bid bi > 0 is profitable. QED
Lemma 8 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale. Then H is continuous on (0,∞).
Proof. Suppose that there exists b′ > 0 where H is not continuous; i.e., Pr[b˜s = b′] > 0.
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Define θm = φ(b′)−1/m for all m large enough such that θm > 0. Let b = limm→∞ β(θm).
We have b = b′ because otherwise Pr[β(θ˜i) ∈ (b, b′)] = 0 which would imply us((b′ + b)/2) >
us(b
′).
By (9) there exists ξ > 0 such that Pˆφ(b′)(φ(b
′)) ≥ M(φ(b′)) + ξ ≥ b′/δ + ξ because
otherwise us(b
′) < 0. By Lemma 1, the function Pˆφ(b′) is continuous at φ(b′) and thus
Pˆφ(b′)(θ
m) > b′/δ + ξ/2,
for all large m. Therefore, for large m,
ui(b
′, θm)− ui(β(θm), θm)
≥ H(β(θm))F (φ(β(θm)))n−1(β(θm)− b′) + Pr[b˜s ∈ (β(θm), b′)](−1)
+Pr[b˜s = b
′]F (φ(b′))n−1((1− δ)θm + (δPˆφ(b′)(θm)− b′)).
Therefore,
lim inf
m→∞
u1(b
′, θm)− u1(b1(θm), θm)
≥ Pr[b˜s = b′]F (φ(b′))n−1(δPˆφ(b′)(θm)− b′)) > 0.
I.e., for large m type θm has a profitable deviation. QED
Lemma 9 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale, and let φ be defined by (22). Then β is continuous. Moreover, φ(β(θi)) = θi for
all θi ∈ [0, 1]. The function φ is continuous and strictly increasing.
Proof. Standard.
Lemma 10 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale, and let φ be defined by (22). Then β(θi) < θi for all θi ∈ (0, 1]. Moreover,
φ(b) > b for all b ∈ (0, β(1)].
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Proof. Suppose that β(θi) ≥ θi > 0. Then β(θi) > 0, implying H(β(θi)) > 0 by Lemma 6.
Now Lemma 4 shows that β(θi) = θi. Finally, a computation similar to that in the proof of
Lemma 4 shows that a deviation to the bid bi = θi/2 is profitable—a contradiction.
The claim about φ now follows from Lemma 9. QED
The following lemma establishes the differential equation that characterizes the bid func-
tion β, and simultaneously determines the bid distribution H. The proof relies on local
optimality of every regular-bidder type’s bid, and on the result from Lemma 7 that the spec-
ulator’s payoff equals 0. Throughout the proof, we distinguish two kinds of bids b ∈ (0, β(1)]:
we write Ξ(b) = 0 if b has a neighborhood where the speculator bids with probability 0, and
write Ξ(b) = 1 otherwise.
We begin by using upward optimality of the bid function β to derive an inequality (29) in
terms of H and the inverse bid function φ. Inequality (29) captures that the payoff increase
effect from buying more often in the auction and less often from the speculator, weighted
with the probability mass H(bi)−H(b′i), is offset by the payoff decrease effect from bidding
higher and winning more often against one of the other regular bidders.
We continue by showing that H is locally Lipschitz continuous on (0, β(1)]. Local Lips-
chitz continuity around any b with Ξ(b) = 0 is easy because H is locally constant there. If
Ξ(b) = 1, then we use (9) and the result that the speculator obtains 0 payoff (31) to obtain
a positive lower bound (32) for the payoff increase effect in (29). Because the payoff increase
effect is weighted with the probability mass H(bi)−H(b′i), we can conclude that H is locally
Lipschitz around b.
The payoff decrease effect in (29) is confirmed in (33) and is then used to show in (34)
that the slope of the inverse bid function φ is bounded above by the slope that would be
relevant in the absence of a resale opportunity.
Next we use downward optimality of the bid function β to derive an inequality (35)
parallel to (29). Inequality (35) includes a payoff increase effect from bidding lower and
winning less often against one of the other regular bidders, as confirmed in (36).
Combining the payoff decrease effect (33) with the payoff increase effect (36), we obtain
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the slope of the inverse bid function φ in the neighborhood of points where the speculator
does not bid (37). Combining this with the 0-payoff condition for the speculator and with
the upper bound (34) we obtain a differential equation (40) for φ. Inverting this equation
yields the differential equation (18) for β. Using that K is strictly decreasing in its second
argument, we show that the solution to (18) is unique.
Finally, we combine the inequalities (29) and (35) derived from upward and downward
optimality of β with the fact that H is locally Lipschitz to obtain a differential equation for
H, see (42). This equation has the unique solution (19).
Lemma 11 Let (β,H,M) be a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the first-price auction
with resale and φ be defined by (22). Then β satisfies (18) and is uniquely determined by
these conditions. The distribution H is given by (19).
Proof. For all i ∈ I, bi ∈ (0, β(1)], and θi ∈ [0, 1],
ui(bi, θi) = H(bi)F (φ(bi))
n−1(θi − bi) (27)
+δ
∫ ∞
bi
F (φ(bs))
n−1(θiQˆφ(bs)(θi)− Pˆφ(bs)(θi))dH(bs).
Consider bi, b
′
i ∈ (0, β(1)] with b′i < bi, and θ′i = φ(b′i). Note that
δ
∫ bi
b′i
F (φ(bs))
n−1 Qˆφ(bs)(θ
′
i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in bs
(
θ′i −
Pˆφ(bs)(θ
′
i)
Qˆφ(bs)(θ
′
i)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
decreasing in bs by (1)
dH(bs)
≤ δF (φ(bi))n−1
(
φ(b′i)− Pˆφ(b′i)(φ(b′i))
)
(H(bi)−H(b′i)), (28)
because Qˆφ(b′i)(φ(b
′
i)) = 1. Hence,
0
(12)
≥ ui(bi, θ′i)− ui(b′i, θ′i)
(27)
=
(
H(bi)F (φ(bi))
n−1 −H(b′i)F (φ(b′i))n−1
)
θ′i
− (H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1bi −H(b′i)F (φ(b′i))n−1b′i)
−δ
∫ bi
b′i
F (φ(bs))
n−1(Qˆφ(bs)(θ
′
i)θ
′
i − Pˆφ(bs)(θ′i))dH(bs)
(28)
≥ −H(b′i)k1(bi, b′i)(bi − b′i) + k2(bi, b′i)(H(bi)−H(b′i)), (29)
19
where
k1(bi, b
′
i) = F (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (φ(b′i))n−1
bi − b′i
(φ(b′i)− b′i),
k2(bi, b
′
i) = F (φ(bi))
n−1
(
φ(b′i)(1− δ) + δPˆφ(b′i)(φ(b′i))− bi
)
.
Consider any b ∈ (0, β(1)]. We write Ξ(b) = 0 if
∃ν > 0 : Pr[b˜s ∈ (b− ν, b+ ν)] = 0,
and Ξ(b) = 1 otherwise. By Lemma 7,
if Ξ(b) = 1 then ∃(cm), cm → b, cm 6= b : δM(φ(cm)) = cm. (30)
Therefore, by continuity of M and φ,
if Ξ(b) = 1 then M(φ(b)) = b. (31)
Suppose that Ξ(b) = 0. Then, there exists ν > 0 such that in the neighborhood N(b) =
(b−ν, b+ν)∩ (0, β(1)] of b the function H is constant. In particular, H is Lipschitz in N(b).
Now suppose that Ξ(b) = 1. Using (9) and (31), there exists ξ > 0 such that for all bi, b
′
i in
some neighborhood of b, if b′i < bi,
k2(bi, b
′
i) ≥ F (φ(bi))n−1 (φ(b′i)(1− δ) + δM(φ(b′i)) + δξ − bi)
≥ F (φ(bi))n−1 δξ
2
.
Therefore,
∀b,Ξ(b) = 1 ∃k(b) > 0 and a neighborhood N (b) 3 b :
∀bi, b′i ∈ N (b), b′i < bi : k2(bi, b′i) ≥ k(b). (32)
Together with (29) and k1(bi, b
′
i) ≤ 1, (32) implies that H is Lipschitz in N (b). We therefore
conclude that in either case, Ξ(b) = 0 or Ξ(b) = 1, the function H is Lipschitz in a neighbor-
hood of b, proving that H is locally Lipschitz in (0, β(1)]. In particular, H is differentiable
almost everywhere on (0, β(1)].
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Next we show that
∀bi ∈ (0, β(1)], b′i ∈ (0, β(1)], b′i < bi : k1(bi, b′i) ≥ 0. (33)
Consider any b ∈ (0, β(1)]. If Ξ(b) = 0 then k1(bi, b′i) ≥ 0 holds for all bi, b′i in a neighborhood
of b because H(bi) = H(b
′
i). If Ξ(b) = 1, then (32) together with (29) implies that k1(bi, b
′
i) ≥
0 holds for all bi, b
′
i in a neighborhood of b. This completes the proof of (33).
Using the definition of k1, (33) implies
∀bi ∈ (0, β(1)), φ differentiable at bi : φ′(bi) ≤ 1
N(φ(bi), bi)
. (34)
Note that for all bi, b
′
i ∈ (0, β(1)] with b′i < bi, and θi = φ(bi),
0 ≤ ui(bi, θi)− ui(b′i, θi)
=
(
H(bi)F (φ(bi))
n−1 −H(b′i)F (φ(b′i))n−1
)
θi
− (H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1bi −H(b′i)F (φ(b′i))n−1b′i)
−δ
∫ bi
b′i
F (φ(bs))
n−1(Qˆφ(bs)(θi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by (4)
θi − Pˆφ(bs)(θi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Pˆθi (θi) by (4)
)dH(bs)
≤ −H(bi)l1(bi, b′i)(bi − b′i) + l2(bi, b′i)(H(bi)−H(b′i)), (35)
where
l1(bi, b
′
i) = F (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (φ(b′i))n−1
bi − b′i
(φ(bi)− b′i),
l2(bi, b
′
i) = F (φ(b
′
i))
n−1
(
φ(bi)(1− δ) + δPˆφ(bi)(φ(bi))− b′i
)
.
Consider any b ∈ (0, β(1)] such that Ξ(b) = 0. Then, (35) implies the existence of a
neighborhood N (b) of b such that
∀bi ∈ N (b), b′i ∈ N (b), b′i < bi : l1(bi, b′i) ≤ 0. (36)
Taken together, (33) and (36) imply for all bi ∈ N (b) that F (φ)n−1 is differentiable at bi and
lim
b′i→bi
F (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (φ(b′i))n−1
bi − b′i
=
F (φ(bi))
n−1
φ(bi)− bi .
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Hence, φ is differentiable at bi ∈ (b), and,
∀b, Ξ(b) = 0, bi ∈ N (b) : φ′(bi) = 1
N(φ(bi), bi)
. (37)
Note also,
∀b, δM(φ(b)) = b, φ differentiable at b :
δM ′(φ(b))φ′(b) = lim
bi↘b
δM(φ(bi))− δM(φ(b))
bi − b ≤ 1, (38)
because δM(φ(bi)) ≤ bi for all bi, by Lemma 7.
By (30),
∀b, Ξ(b) = 1, φ differentiable at b : δM ′(φ(b))φ′(b) = 1. (39)
In summary, for all b ∈ (0, β(1)] such that φ is differentiable at b,
φ′(b) =
 1N(φ(b),b) if δM(φ(b)) < b,min{ 1
N(φ(b),b)
, 1
δM ′(φ(b))} if δM(φ(b)) = b,
(40)
by (31), (34), (37), (38), and (39). Next we show that β is Lipschitz continuous. By (33),
F (φ)n−1 is locally Lipschitz in (0, 1], implying that φ is locally Lipschitz in (0, 1]. Hence,
∀c, d ∈ (0, β(1)] : φ(d)− φ(c) =
∫ d
c
φ′(b)db, (41)
where φ′ is given almost everywhere by (40).
The mapping b 7→ N(φ(b), b) is bounded above on [0, β(1)] because N(φ(b), b) ≤ (n −
1)f(φ(b))φ(b)/F (φ(b))→ n−1 as b→ 0. Moreover,M ′ is bounded above on [0, 1] by Lemma
2. Therefore, φ′ is bounded below by a positive number. Hence, β is Lipschitz on [0, 1] by
(41).
Because β is the inverse of φ, (40) implies (18).
As for uniqueness, let β and γ be two Lipschitz continuous functions that satisfy (18).
By definition of K, if β(θ) > γ(θ) then K(θ, β(θ)) < K(θ, γ(θ)), for all θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
β ≤ γ. The same argument shows β ≥ γ.
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Next we show that H satisfies
h(b) ≡ H ′(b) = H(b)Lφ(b) a.e. b ∈ (0, β(1)]. (42)
Consider any b ∈ (0, β(1)]. If Ξ[b] = 0 and b = δM(φ(b)), then h(b) = 0 and, by (37),
Rφ(b) = 0. Hence, h(b) = 0 = H(b)Lφ(b), as was to be shown. If Ξ[b] = 0 and b > δM(φ(b)),
then h(b) = 0 = H(b)Lφ(b) by definition of Lφ. Finally suppose that Ξ[b] = 1. The function
rˆ is continuous. Hence, using Lemma 1, the function b′ 7→ Pˆφ(b′)(φ(b′)) is continuous on
(0, 1]. Therefore,
lim
b′↗b
k2(b, b
′) = Sφ(b)F (φ(b)) = lim
b′′↘b
l2(b
′′, b) ∀ b ∈ (0, β(1)]. (43)
Because φ is differentiable almost everywhere,
lim
b′↗b
k1(b, b
′) = Rφ(b)F (φ(b)) = lim
b′′↘b
l1(b
′′, b) a.e. b ∈ (0, β(1)]. (44)
From (29), (35), (43), and (44) we get (42).
It is straightforward that (19) satisfies (42). It remains to be shown that (42) together
with the boundary condition H(β(1)) = 1 (which holds because the speculator does not bid
more than necessary to win for sure) has only one solution. Observe that, for all  > 0, L is
bounded above on [, β(1)] due to (9). Therefore, applying the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem to
the differential equation (42) implies that H is unique on [, 1]. As a distribution function,
H is right-continuous at 0 and thus uniquely determined at 0 as well. QED
We now turn to the equilibrium existence proof. Lemma 12 shows the existence of a
solution for a class of discontinuous differential equations. These equations are constructed
by altering a continuous differential equation such that if the solution function hits the
boundary value 0, the solution remains there until the slope becomes positive again.
To prove the existence of a solution, the differential equation is transformed into an
upper hemi-continuous differential inclusion that allows a set of slopes (including 0) for the
solution function if it reaches the value 0, and allows only the slope 0 if a negative value is
reached. For the differential inclusion a solution exists by a theorem of Aubin and Cellina
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(1984). One then shows that the solution in fact does not take negative values and solves
the original differential equation almost everywhere.
Lemma 12 Let θ, θ ∈ IR and consider a bounded and continuous function Nˆ : [θ, θ]×IR→ IR.
Define
Kˆ(θ, b) =
 Nˆ(θ, b) if b > 0,max{0, Nˆ(θ, b)} if b ≤ 0. (45)
Then the initial value problem
βˆ(θ) = 0, βˆ′(θ) = Kˆ(θ, βˆ(θ)) a.e. θ ∈ [θ, θ], (46)
has a Lipschitz continuous solution βˆ.
For all θ such that βˆ(θ) > 0, the function βˆ is differentiable at θ.
Proof. Following Aubin-Cellina (1984, p. 101), define
K(θ, b) =
⋂
>0
co Kˆ(B(θ, b)),
where B(θ, b) denotes the -ball around (θ, b) according to any norm in IR
2, and co denotes
the closed-convex-hull operator. Then,K is an upper hemi-continuous (or, in Aubin-Cellina’s
(1984) terminology, upper semi-continuous) correspondence, and its values are closed and
convex. Moreover, K is globally bounded. Therefore, the differential inclusion problem
βˆ′(θ) ∈ K(θ, βˆ(θ)) a.e. θ ∈ (θ, θ), βˆ(θ) = 0, (47)
has an absolutely continuous solution βˆ (see Aubin-Cellina, 1984, Theorem 4, p. 101). Note
that, by (47), for a.e. θ ∈ [θ, θ]: if βˆ(θ) < 0 then βˆ′(θ) ≥ 0. Hence,
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] : βˆ(θ) ≥ 0. (48)
We will now show that βˆ satisfies (46). First, consider θ ∈ [θ, θ] with βˆ(θ) > 0, or βˆ(θ) = 0
and Nˆ(θ, 0) ≥ 0. Then, K(θ, βˆ(θ) = Kˆ(θ, βˆ(θ)).
Second, consider θ ∈ [θ, θ] with βˆ(θ) = 0 and Nˆ(θ, 0) < 0. For a.e. such θ, (47) implies
βˆ′(θ) ≤ 0. On the other hand, βˆ′(θ) ≥ 0 by (48). Therefore, βˆ′(θ) = 0 = Kˆ(θ, βˆ(θ)),
completing the proof of (46).
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Because βˆ is absolutely continuous,
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] : βˆ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
Kˆ(θ′, βˆ(θ′))dθ′. (49)
This together with the fact that Kˆ is bounded, implies that βˆ is Lipschitz continuous. If
βˆ(θ) > 0 for some θ, then Kˆ(θ′, βˆ(θ′)) = Nˆ(θ′, βˆ(θ′)) for all θ′ that are sufficiently close to
θ. Continuity of Nˆ together with (49) then implies that βˆ is differentiable at θ. QED
Let βI denote the standard equilibrium bid function of the first-price auction with n
regular bidders and no resale opportunity. The following result is well known.
Lemma 13 Let N be defined as in (15). Then
βI(0) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] : βI′(θ) = N(θ, βI(θ)).
The next lemma constructs the equilibrium bid function β for the regular bidders. One
first shows that bidder types close to 0 make the same bid as in the absence of a resale
opportunity. To extend the bid function to the higher types, Lemma 12 is applied to a
differential equation for the excess of the regular bidders’ bid function β over the fictitious
bid function δM that corresponds to a 0 payoff for the speculator.
Lemma 14 The initial value problem (18) has a solution β on [0, 1] with the following prop-
erties:
β is Lipschitz continuous on [0, 1], (50)
∀θ ∈ (0, 1] : β(θ) < θ, (51)
β is strictly increasing on [0, 1], (52)
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] : β(θ) ≥ δM(θ), (53)
φ ≡ β−1 is Lipschitz continuous on [0, β(1)]. (54)
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Proof. Define θ to be the smallest θ ∈ [0, 1] with βI(θ) = δM(θ) (let θ = 1 if no such θ
exists). Because βI′(0) = (n− 1)/n > δM ′(0) by (7), we have θ > 0. Defining β(θ) = βI(θ)
for θ ∈ [0, θ], it follows from Lemma 13 that (18) is satisfied for θ ∈ [0, θ], and it follows
from the theory of first-price auctions without resale that β has the desired properties (50)
to (54) on [0, θ].
Define Nˆ : [θ, 1]× IR→ IR by
Nˆ(θ, b) =

N(θ, b+ δM(θ))− δM ′(θ), if b ∈ [0, θ − δM(θ)],
N(θ, θ)− δM ′(θ), if b > θ − δM(θ),
N(θ, δM(θ))− δM ′(θ), if b < 0,
and define Kˆ as in (45) with θ = 1. Then, Lemma 12 implies that there exists a Lipschitz
continuous βˆ such that (46) holds. By definition of Kˆ,
∀θ ∈ [θ, 1] : 0 ≤ βˆ(θ) ≤ θ − δM(θ).
Therefore, β(θ) ≡ βˆ(θ) + δM(θ), θ ∈ [θ, 1], yields a Lipschitz continuous solution for (18).
To prove (51), suppose that β(θ) ≥ θ for some θ > θ. Let θ′ be minimal with that
property. Then, β(θ′) = θ′ > δM(θ′). Thus, β is differentiable at θ′ by Lemma 12. Also,
Nˆ(θ, βˆ(θ)) = −δM ′(θ). Hence, β′(θ′) = 0. Thus, β(θ) > θ for some θ < θ′, a contradiction.
To prove (52), observe that
β′(θ)
(18)
= K(θ, β(θ))
(14)
≥ N(θ, β(θ)) (51)> 0 a.e. θ ≥ θ.
This also implies that β′ is bounded below by a positive number on [θ, 1]. Hence, φ is
Lipschitz on [β(θ), β(1)]; i.e., (54) follows. Inequality (53) is immediate from (14) and (18).
QED
The final lemma towards the proof of Proposition 1 shows equilibrium existence. We
begin by showing that (19) yields a well-defined distribution function. Next, although by
construction of the differential equation (18) the bid function β satisfies the first-order con-
dition for optimal bidding for every regular-bidder type, it remains to be shown is that
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β is globally optimal. To get this, we show quasi-concavity of the regular bidders’ payoff
function. When considering upward deviations, we must take care of the possibility that
a regular bidder deviates to a higher bid in an attempt to offer the good for resale. No
such complication arises in the context of downward deviations because such a deviation
does not lead to additional resale offers from competing regular bidders. Optimality of the
speculator’s bid distribution follows by construction.
Lemma 15 The first-price auction with resale has a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium
(β,H,M).
Proof. Define β according to Lemma 14, and define φ = β−1. The first step is to show
that H as defined by (19) is a well-defined distribution function. For any given  > 0, (9)
implies that there exists ξ > 0 such that
∀b ∈ [, β(1)] : if b = δM(φ(b)) then δPˆφ(b)(φ(b)) ≥ b+ δξ. (55)
By definition of K,
β′(φ(b)) ≥ N(φ(b), β(φ(b))) a.e. b ∈ (0, β(1)],
implying
Rφ(b)
(17)
≥ 0 a.e. b ∈ (0, β(1)]. (56)
From (55) and (56) it follows that Lφ (cf. (16)) is well-defined almost everywhere, and is
bounded above on [, β(1)] for any given  > 0. Hence, H is Lipschitz continuous on [, β(1)]
for every  > 0. Moreover, because Lφ is non-negative H is weakly increasing on (0, β(1)]
and the limit H(0) = limb↘0H(b) exists. Therefore, H is a distribution function.
Let post-auction beliefs and resale mechanisms be defined by (10) and (11). It remains
to be shown that (12) and (13) hold.
To show (12), first consider any deviating bid bi ∈ (0, β(θi)) of a bidder i 6= s with type
θi ∈ (0, 1]. After winning at bi, it is optimal for bidder i to consume the good because she
believes that the highest use value among bidders other than herself is at most φ(bi) < θi.
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Also, if some bidder j ∈ I \{i} wins after making her equilibrium bid then bidder j consumes
the good in period 1. Hence, bidder i’s payoff is given by
ui(bi, θi) = H(bi)F (φ(bi))
n−1(θi − bi) + δ
∫ ∞
bi
F (φ(bs))
n−1Uˆφ(bs)(θi)dH(bs),
where
Uˆφ(bs)(θi) ≡ θiQˆφ(bs)(θi)− Pˆφ(bs)(θi).
Because φ and H are locally Lipschitz continuous on (0, β(1)], the mapping bi 7→ ui(bi, θi) has
the same property and is differentiable Lebesgue-a.e. in (0, 1). Hence, for a.e. bi ∈ (0, β(θi)),
∂ui
∂bi
(bi, θi) = H(bi)F (φ(bi))
n−2 ((n− 1)f(φ(bi))φ′(bi)(θi − bi)− F (φ(bi)))
+H ′(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
(
θi − bi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi)
)
θi≥φ(bi)≥ H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
(
(n− 1) f(φ(bi))
F (φ(bi))
(φ(bi)− bi)φ′(bi)− 1
)
+H ′(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
(
θi − bi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi)
)
.
By definition of Rφ and because H
′(bi) = Lφ(bi)H(bi) by (19),
∂ui
∂bi
(bi, θi)
H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
≥ −Rφ(bi) + Lφ(bi)
(
θi − bi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi)
)
. (57)
To show that
∂ui
∂bi
(bi, θi) ≥ 0 a.e. bi ∈ (0, β(θi)), (58)
we distinguish two cases. If bi > δM(φ(bi)), then β(φ(bi)) > δM(φ(bi)), hence β
′(φ(bi)) =
N(φ(bi), bi) by (18). Thus, Rφ(bi) = 0. Moreover, Lφ(bi) = 0 by definition of Lφ. Hence,
(58) follows from (57).
If bi = δM(φ(bi)) then Rφ(bi) = Lφ(bi)Sφ(bi) by definition of Lφ. Using this and the
definition of Sφ(bi), (57) implies
∂ui
∂bi
(bi, θi)
H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
≥ Lφ(bi)
(
θi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi)− (1− δ)φ(bi)− δPˆφ(bi)(φ(bi))
)
.
Now (58) follows from Uˆφ(bi)(θi) = θi − Pˆφ(bi)(φ(bi)) by (4).
From (58) it follows that type θi cannot gain from deviating to any bid bi ∈ [0, β(θi)).
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Now consider a deviating bid bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)]. Suppose first that bidder i offers the
good for resale upon winning. We obtain an upper bound vi(bi, θi) for bidder i’s payoff by
assuming she gets the entire surplus that is available in the resale market,
vi(bi, θi) = H(bi)
(
F (φ(bi))
n−1(δθi − bi) + δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
(θ′ − θi)dF (θ′)n−1
)
+δ
∫ ∞
bi
F (φ(bs))
n−1Uφ(bs)(θi)dH(bs).
For a.e. bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)),
∂vi
∂bi
(bi, θi)
θi≤φ(bi)≤ H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
(
(n− 1) f(φ(bi))
F (φ(bi))
(δφ(bi)− bi)φ′(bi)− 1
)
+H ′(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
(
δθi − bi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi) + δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
θ′ − θi
F (φ(bi))n−1
d(F (θ′)n−1)
)
.
By definition of Rφ and δ ≤ 1, and because H ′(bi) = Lφ(bi)H(bi) by (19),
∂vi
∂bi
(bi, θi)
H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
≤ −Rφ(bi) + Lφ(bi)
(
δθi − bi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi)
∫ φ(bi)
θi
+ δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
θ′ − θi
F (φ(bi))n−1
dF (θ′)n−1
)
. (59)
To show that
∂vi
∂bi
(bi, θi) ≤ 0 a.e. bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)), (60)
we distinguish two cases. If bi > δM(φ(bi)), then Rφ(bi) = 0 by (18) and Lφ(bi) = 0 by
definition of Lφ. Hence, (60) follows from (59).
If bi = δM(φ(bi)) then Rφ(bi) = Lφ(bi)Sφ(bi). Using this and the definition of Sφ(bi),
(59) implies
∂vi
∂bi
(bi, θi)
H(bi)F (φ(bi))n−1
≤ Lφ(bi)
(
δθi − δUˆφ(bi)(θi) + δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
θ′ − θi
F (φ(bi))n−1
d(F (θ′)n−1)
∫ φ(bi)
θi
− (1− δ)φ(bi)− δPˆφ(bi)(φ(bi))
)
. (61)
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Using the envelope theorem in integral form and integration by parts, the expression in
brackets on the right-hand side of (61) can be simplified:
(. . . ) = δθi − φ(bi) + δ
(
Uˆφ(bi)(φ(bi))− Uˆφ(bi)(θi)
)
+δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
θ′ − θi
F (φ(bi))n−1
d(F (θ′)n−1)
= δθi − φ(bi) + δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
F (θ′)n−1
F (φ(bi))n−1
dθ′ + δ
∫ φ(bi)
θi
θ′ − θi
F (φ(bi))n−1
d(F (θ′)n−1)
= δθi − φ(bi) + δ θ′ F (θ
′)n−1
F (φ(bi))n−1
∣∣∣∣φ(bi)
θi
− δθiF (φ(bi))
n−1 − F (θi)n−1
F (φ(bi))n−1
= −(1− δ)φ(bi) ≤ 0.
Hence, (60) follows from (61).
Finally, consider a deviating bid bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)] and suppose that bidder i consumes
the good upon winning. Let vˇi(bi, θi) denote the corresponding payoff. Using techniques
analogous to those leading to (58) and (60), one shows that
∂vˇi
∂bi
(bi, θi) ≤ 0 a.e. bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)). (62)
An upper bound for bidder i’s payoff with any bid bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)] is
ui(bi, θi) ≡ max{vi(bi, θi), vˇi(bi, θi)}.
Because the maximum of two locally Lipschitz continuous functions is locally Lipschitz itself,
the mapping bi 7→ ui(bi, θi) can be written as the integral over its derivative. Moreover,
ui(β(θi), θi) = ui(β(θi), θi). Therefore, (60) and (62) imply that for all bi ∈ (β(θi), β(1)],
ui(bi, θi)− ui(β(θi), θi) ≤ ui(bi, θi)− ui(β(θi), θi)
=
∫ bi
β(θi)
∂ui
∂bi
(b, θi)db ≤ 0.
Hence, no type θi > 0 has an incentive to deviate. By continuity of ui, type θi = 0 has no
incentive to deviate either. This completes the proof of (12).
To complete the equilibrium existence proof, we have to show (13). From (53) it follows
that bs ≥ δM(φ(bs)), and thus us(bs) ≤ 0, for all bs ∈ (0, β(1)]. It remains to be shown that
Pr[us(b˜s) < 0] = 0.
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Consider the event us(b˜s) < 0. Then, β(φ(b˜s)) > δM(φ(b˜s)) and thus Lφ(b˜s) = 0. Using
(19), the probability of that event is∫
(0,β(1)]
1Lφ(bs)=0h(bs)dbs =
∫
(0,β(1)]
1Lφ(bs)=0Lφ(bs)H(bs)dbs = 0.
QED
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Observe that Proposition 1 allows the possibility that H(0) = 1; i.e., the speculator
may not play an active role at all. The following Proposition 2 shows that the answer to
the question whether the speculator plays an active role depends on the distribution F , the
discount factor δ, and the number of regular bidders n. For any given n, Proposition 2
determines the smallest discount factor δn such that the speculator plays an active role for
some F . To this end, we show that the type of distribution described on p. 18 of the Note
is the most favorable for speculative activity so that we can define
δn = min
z∈[0,1]
η(z, n)
ρ(z, n)
. (63)
The intuition is as follows. Because the distribution of the types below the resale reserve
price is irrelevant for the resale revenue, the most favorable distribution for the speculator is
the one with the smallest expectation conditional on the information that the value is below
the reserve price. One cannot shift all the probability weight to 0 because that would violate
the increasing hazard rate assumption; the best one can do is to shift probability weight to
lower values until the hazard rate is constant—this yields the exponential shape. Above the
resale reserve price the best that can happen for the speculator is that all the probability
weight is concentrated just above the reserve price so that the bidders obtain no information
rent. This yields the type of distribution of the above example.
Proposition 2 For every regular-bidder number n ≥ 2, there exists a discount factor δn < 1
such that the following holds in the quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of a first-price or
Dutch auction with resale:
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(i) for all δ > δn, there exists a distribution F satisfying Assumption 1 such that the
speculator plays an active role;
(ii) for all δ ≤ δn and all F satisfying Assumption 1, the speculator bids 0 and the regular
bidders use the same bid function as in the absence of a resale opportunity.
Moreover, δn → 1 as n→∞.
Proof. Observe that, for all (F, n, δ),
if H(0) = 1 then β = βI. (64)
To see (64), suppose that H(0) = 1. Then (19) implies Lφ(b) = 0 a.e. b ∈ [0, β(1)]. Hence,
β = βI by Lemma 13, (16), (17), and (18).9
The argument given in Section 5 of the Note together with (64) proves part (i). To prove
the “Moreover” part, note that
ρ(z, n) ≤ 1, min
z∈[0,1]
η(z, n)→n→∞ 1.
To prove part (ii), we need additional notation concerning order statistics. For any distribu-
tion function D, let D(k,l) denote the distribution function for the lth-highest order statistic
among k i.i.d. random variables (k = 1, 2 . . . ; l = 1, . . . , k) that are distributed according to
D.
Fix any n ≥ 2, δ ≤ δn, and F with an increasing hazard rate. Suppose that β = βI.
To complete the proof of (ii), it is sufficient to show that us(bs) ≤ 0 for all bs ≥ 0 (because
then H with H(0) = 1 is a best-response bid distribution of the speculator, and β is a
best-response bid function of the regular bidders by (64)).
By definition of βI, if bs = β
I(1),
us(bs) = pi(F, n, δ) ≡ δM(1)−
∫ 1
0
θdF (n−1,1)(θ). (65)
If bs < β
I(1) and θˆ ≡ (βI)−1(bs),
us(bs) = F (θˆ)
n
(
δM(θˆ)−
∫ 1
0
θdFˆ
(n−1,1)
[0,θˆ]
(θ)
)
= F (θˆ)npi(Fˆ[0,θˆ], n, δ).
9The result that the bid function β = βI yields an equilibrium in the absence of bids by the speculator
already appears in Haile (1999, Theorem 1).
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Hence, w.l.o.g. it is sufficient to show that
pi(F, n, δ) ≤ 0. (66)
Rearranging (5), one finds
M(1) = n(1− F (rˇ))F (rˇ)n−1rˇ +
∫ 1
rˇ
θdF (n,2)(θ),
where rˇ ≡ rˆ(1). Hence, using (65),
pi(F, n, δ) (67)
= δ
(
n(1− F (rˇ))F (rˇ)n−1rˇ +
∫ 1
rˇ
θdF (n,2)(θ)
)
−
∫ 1
0
θdF (n−1,1)(θ).
Observe that rˇ = 1/λ(rˇ) by definition of the function rˆ, where λ(θ) = f(θ)/(1 − F (θ))
denotes for all θ ∈ [0, 1) the hazard function for F . We can write
F (θ) = 1− e−
∫ θ
0 λ(t)dt.
Let µ = (1/rˇ)
∫ rˇ
0
λ(t)dt. Then ∫ rˇ
0
(λ(t)− µ)dt = 0.
Because λ(t)− µ is weakly increasing in t,
∀θ ∈ [0, rˇ] :
∫ θ
0
λ(t)dt ≤
∫ θ
0
µdt = θµ.
Therefore,
∀θ ∈ [0, rˇ] : F (θ) ≤ J(θ) ≡ 1− e−θµ.
Also define J(θ) = F (θ) for θ ∈ (rˇ, 1]. Then J(rˇ) = F (rˇ) and F stochastically dominates J .
Therefore, using (67),
pi(F, n, δ) ≤ pˇi ≡ δ
(
n(1− J(rˇ))J(rˇ)n−1rˇ +
∫ 1
rˇ
θdJ (n,2)(θ)
)
−
∫ 1
0
θdJ (n−1,1)(θ). (68)
For arbitrary i.i.d. random variables with densities, the highest of n− 1 dominates the 2nd
highest of n in terms of the likelihood ratio. Therefore, the expectation of the highest of n−1
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conditional on being greater or equal to rˇ is greater or equal to the respective conditional
expectation of the 2nd highest of n,
1
1− J (n,2)(rˇ)
∫ 1
rˇ
θdJ (n,2)(θ) ≤ eˇ ≡ 1
1− J (n−1,1)(rˇ)
∫ 1
rˇ
θdJ (n−1,1)(θ).
Therefore, using the definition of pˇi from (68),
pˇi ≤ δ (n(1− J(rˇ))J(rˇ)n−1rˇ + (1− J (n,2)(rˇ))eˇ)
−
∫ rˇ
0
θdJ (n−1,1)(θ)− (1− J (n−1,1)(rˇ))eˇ.
Because J (n−1,1)(rˇ) ≤ J (n,2)(rˇ) and eˇ ≥ rˇ, it follows that
pˇi ≤ δ (n(1− J(rˇ))J(rˇ)n−1rˇ + (1− J (n,2)(rˇ))rˇ)
−
∫ rˇ
0
θdJ (n−1,1)(θ)− (1− J (n−1,1)(rˇ))rˇ
= δ
(
1− (1− e−z)n) rˇ
−rˇ(n− 1)1
z
∫ z
0
τe−τ (1− e−τ )n−2dτ − (1− (1− e−z)n−1)rˇ
= rˇ(δρ(z, n)− η(z, n)), (69)
where z ≡ µrˇ = µ/λ(rˇ) ≤ 1 and we have made the substitution τ = θµ in the integral.
Because δ ≤ δn, (63) implies δρ(z, n) − η(z, n) ≤ 0. Hence, (69) together with (68) shows
(66). QED
Proposition 3 below shows that the presence of a resale opportunity never reduces initial
seller revenue, and strictly increases it if the speculator plays an active role. This result
follows because each regular-bidder type bids at least as much in the presence of a resale
opportunity as without one, and the initial seller collects the speculator’s bid if she wins. The
proof below derives the result by comparing the differential equation (18) with the differential
equation that is relevant in the absence of a resale opportunity (cf. Lemma 13).10
10A direct proof that does not go through the differential equation (18) would follow the arguments leading
to (34) in the proof of Lemma 11, which is sufficient to make the appropriate comparison of differential
equations.
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Proposition 3 For any regular-bidder number n ≥ 2, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and dis-
tribution F satisfying Assumption 1, the presence of a resale opportunity does not reduce
initial seller revenue from a first-price or Dutch auction, and strictly increases it if (F, n, δ)
is such that the speculator plays an active role.
Proof. From (18) it follows
β′(θ) ≥ N(θ, β(θ)) a.e. θ ∈ [0, 1]. (70)
By β(0) = 0, Lemma 13, and (70),
∀θ ∈ [0, 1] : β(θ) ≥ βI(θ).
This shows that the resale opportunity never reduces initial seller revenue. If the speculator
wins with positive probability, the resale opportunity strictly increases initial seller revenue
because the initial seller collects the speculator’s bid. QED
3 The second-price auction with resale
In this section we construct and discuss a continuum of pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equi-
libria for second-price auctions with resale where the speculator plays an active role. Propo-
sition 4 describes the equilibria. Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 evaluate the impact of a
resale opportunity on initial seller revenue.
Let β denote bidder i’s (i ∈ I) bid in the second-price auction as a function of her use
value. Let bˆs = b˜s denote the speculator’s bid (we do not allow randomization, hence b˜s is a
degenerate random variable).
To define post-auction beliefs, consider any bidder j ∈ I and let bj ≥ 0 denote her bid.
Let i ∈ I ∪{s} denote the label of the winner. Then, the probability distribution Πj(· | i, bj)
denotes the post-auction belief about j’s use value of bidders other than j.
Let M(i,b−i, θi) denote the resale mechanism used by the resale seller i ∈ I ∪ {s} after
a second-price auction when the vector of losers’ bids is b−i ∈ [0,∞)n and i’s use value is
θi. For all i, j ∈ I ∪ s with j 6= i, all b−i, and all θi, θj, let Pj(i,b−i, θi, θj) denote the net
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expected transfer from bidder j of type θj to the other bidders (including the transfer to
i) in the mechanism M(i,b−i, θi). Let Qj(i,b−i, θi, θj) denote the probability that bidder
j obtains the good. Let P (i,b−i, θi) denote the expected transfer to the resale seller i, and
Q(i,b−i, θi) the probability that the resale seller keeps the good.
For all i ∈ I, bidder i’s expected payoff when she bids bi ≥ 0 and has the use value θi
equals
ui(bi, θi) = E[(
−b˜(1)−i +max{θi, δ
(
θiQ(i, b˜−i, θi) + P (i, b˜−i, θi)
)
}
)
1w(bi,b˜−i)=i
+
∑
j 6=i
δ
(
θiQi(j, (bi, b˜−j−i), θ˜j, θi)− Pi(j, (bi, b˜−j−i), θ˜j, θi)
)
1w(bi,b˜−i)=j ],
where w denotes the period-1 winner as a function of the bid profile, and where the max-term
reflects the condition that after winning in period 1 bidder i decides optimally whether to
consume the good or offer it for resale. The speculator’s payoff when she bids bs ≥ 0 is given
by
us(bs) = E[
(
−b˜(1)−s + δP (s, b˜−s, θs)
)
1w(bs,b˜−s)=s ].
The equilibrium conditions are (71) that post-auction beliefs about auction losers are deter-
mined by Bayes rule whenever possible, (72) that the resale mechanism is chosen according
to Assumption 4, and (73, 74) that period-1 behavior is optimal.
Definition 2 A tuple (β, bˆs,M) is a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium of the second-
price auction with resale if there exists a belief system
(Πj(· | i, bj))j∈I, i∈I∪{s}, bj≥0 such that the following holds:
∀i ∈ I ∪ {s}, j ∈ I \ {i}, bj ≥ 0 :
Πj(· | i, bj) = Fˆβ−1(bj) if bj ∈ β([0, 1]), (71)
∀i ∈ I ∪ {s}, b−i ∈ [0,∞)n, θi :
M(i,b−i, θi) = Mˆ((Πj(· | i, bj))j∈I , θi, i), (72)
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∀i 6= s, θi : β(θi) ∈ argmax
bi≥0
ui(bi, θi), (73)
bˆs ∈ argmax
bs≥0
us(bs). (74)
This equilibrium concept is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, combined with
the symmetry and regularity restrictions formulated in Assumption 2. Like in the first-price
auction case (see the explanation below Definition 1), an equilibrium condition on the post-
auction beliefs about the auction winner is omitted because it would play no role for our
analysis.
The result below describes our equilibria. The structure of these equilibria is analogous
to the equilibria constructed in Proposition 2 of the Note. Condition (77) states that the
resale mechanism used by the speculator is a standard auction with an optimal reserve price.
Observe that if the speculator wins at a strictly positive price, then she is certain about the
maximum use value among all bidders (see (78)), hence the standard auction yields the same
outcome as a take-it-or-leave-it offer equal to the auction’s reserve price.
Proposition 4 For any regular-bidder number n ≥ 2, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and distri-
bution F satisfying Assumption 1, and every θ∗ ∈ [0, 1], the second-price auction with resale
has a quasi-symmetric regular equilibrium (β, bˆs,M) with the properties (75), (76), (77). It
is supported by beliefs satisfying (78).
∀θi : β(θi) =
 0 if θi ∈ [0, θ∗),θi if θi ∈ (θ∗, 1]. (75)
bˆs = θ
∗ − δ
(
θ∗ − Pˆθ∗(θ∗)
)
. (76)
∀b−s : M(s,b−s, 0) =

S(rˆ(θ∗)) if b(1)−s = 0,
S(θ∗) if b(1)−s ∈ (0, θ∗),
S(b(1)−s) if b(1)−s ∈ (θ∗, 1].
(77)
∀i, j 6∈ {s, i}, bj, θj : Πj(θj | i, bj) =

Fˆ[0,θ∗](θj) if bj = 0,
1θj≥θ∗ if bj ∈ (0, θ∗),
1θj≥bj if bj ∈ (θ∗, 1].
(78)
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The proof is a straightforward generalization of the arguments leading to the proof of
Proposition 2 in the Note, except for the following complication. With multiple private-value
bidders, we have to show that a regular bidder with type θi < θ
∗ will not deviate to a bid in
[bˆs, θ
∗] and subsequently offer the good for resale if she wins. A detailed proof is below; here
is a sketch of the argument. Suppose that bidder i makes such a deviation and suppose if she
wins then she appropriates the entire expected surplus that is available in the resale market.
Because an increase of θi changes the resale surplus only if all bidders other than i have types
below θi, the marginal change in expected resale surplus due to an increase of θi equals the
probability that all bidders other than i have types below θi. But this probability equals (or
is an upper bound for, if θi is below the resale reserve price rˆ(θ
∗)) the probability that bidder
i obtains the good if she bids 0 and waits for the speculator’s resale mechanism. Hence, using
the envelope theorem, the derivative of bidder i’s equilibrium payoff with respect to θi is at
most as great as the derivative of the expected resale surplus obtained from the deviation.
Hence, if for any type θi < θ
∗ the deviation it is profitable then it the deviation is also
profitable for type θi = θ
∗. But for type θ∗ the deviation is not profitable by construction of
bˆs.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of (71), (72), and (74), is straightforward. The
proof of (73) is straightforward, too, except for one step: we have to show that a bidder i ∈ I
with type θi ≤ θ∗ cannot profit from deviating to a bid bi ∈ [bˆs, θ∗] and offering the good for
resale if she wins. Observe that bidder i’s resale payoff cannot exceed the entire expected
surplus that is available in the resale market:
ui(bi, θi) ≤ ui(θi) ≡
(
−bˆs + δE
[
max{θi, θ˜(1)−i } | θ˜(1)−i ≤ θ∗
])
F (θ∗)n−1. (79)
A straightforward computation shows that
∂ui
∂θi
(θi) = δF (θi)
n−1. (80)
Bidder i’s equilibrium payoff equals
ui(0, θi) = δ(θiQˆθ∗(θi)− Pˆθ∗(θi))F (θ∗)n−1.
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The Envelope Theorem implies
∂ui
∂θi
(0, θi) =
 δF (θi)n−1 if θi > rˆ(θ∗)0 if θi < rˆ(θ∗). (81)
By (76),
ui(0, θ
∗) ≥ ui(θ∗). (82)
Hence, for all θ′i ≤ θ∗,
ui(0, θ
′
i)− ui(θ′i)
(82)
≥ ui(0, θ′i)− ui(0, θ∗)− (ui(θ′i)− ui(θ∗))
=
∫ θ∗
θ′i
(
∂ui
∂θi
(θi)− ∂ui
∂θi
(0, θi)
)
dθi
(80), (81)
= ≥ 0,
which completes the proof. QED
In contrast to the first-price/Dutch auction setting (cf. Proposition 3), the presence
of a resale opportunity may either increase or decrease initial seller revenue, depending on
which θ∗-equilibrium is played. This comparison assumes that in the absence of a resale
opportunity all bidders use the dominant strategy of bidding their use values.
Proposition 5 For any regular-bidder number n ≥ 2, discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and
distribution F satisfying Assumption 1, the second-price auction with resale has quasi-
symmetric regular equilibria such that the initial seller’s expected revenue is larger (alterna-
tively, smaller) than the expected revenue that results when all bidders bid their use values.
Here is a sketch of the proof. In the θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ = 0 all bidders bid their use
values. It is thus sufficient to show that the revenue of a θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ > 0 is larger
than the revenue of a 0-equilibrium if θ∗ is close to 0, and smaller if θ∗ is close to 1. There
exist two distinct events that cause the revenue of a θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ > 0 to differ from
the revenue that arises in the 0-equilibrium. Event (i) is that θ∗ lies between the highest
and the second-highest use value, in which case revenue changes from the second-highest
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use value to the speculator’s bid. Event (ii) is that θ∗ is larger than the highest bidder use
value, in which case revenue falls from the second-highest use value to 0. If θ∗ approaches
1, the probability of (i) becomes small and the probability of (ii) does not; this implies that
expected revenue is reduced. If θ∗ tends to 0 both events’ probabilities tend to 0, but event
(i) allows one buyer’s use value to stay above θ∗ and thus becomes infinitely more likely than
event (ii). The expected payoff loss from event (ii) is of the order θ∗. It is thus sufficient to
show that event (i) results in an expected payoff gain of the order θ∗. Using the fact that the
expected resale payment of type θ∗ exceeds the speculator’s bid, one obtains a lower bound
for the expected payoff difference in terms of the underlying distribution F . Using properties
of order statistics, one can verify that the payoff difference is positive of the order θ∗ if F is
uniform. Because any continuously differentiable distribution is approximately uniform on
any small interval, the argument extends to any F .
Proof of Proposition 5. For all θ∗ ∈ [0, 1], let R(θ∗) denote the initial seller’s
expected revenue in a θ∗-equilibrium. In particular, pi(0) is the expected revenue of the initial
seller when every bidder bids her use value in period 1. We will show that R(θ∗) > R(0) for
all θ∗ sufficiently close to 0 and R(θ∗) < R(0) for all θ∗ sufficiently close to 1.
Let θ˜(1) and θ˜(2) denote the highest and second highest use value among the regular
bidders.
R(θ∗)−R(0) = Pr[θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)](bˆs − E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)])
+Pr[θ˜(1) < θ∗](0− E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(1) < θ∗]). (83)
We have Pr[θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)] = nF (θ∗)n−1(1 − F (θ∗)) → 0 as θ∗ → 1. Thus, R(θ∗) < R(0)
for all θ∗ sufficiently close to 1.
Let us now consider the case where θ∗ is close to 0. From (76) it follows bˆs ≥ Pˆθ∗(θ∗).
Hence, (83) implies
R(θ∗)−R(0) ≥ Pr[θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)](Pˆθ∗(θ∗)− E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)])
−Pr[θ˜(1) < θ∗] E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(1) < θ∗]. (84)
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By Lemma 1 and because rˆ′(0) = 1/2,
Pˆθ∗(θ
∗)
θ∗
= 1− 1
θ∗F (θ∗)n−1
∫ θ∗
θ∗/2
(f(0)θ + O(θ))n−1 dθ +
O(θ∗)
θ∗
= 1− 1
θ∗F (θ∗)n−1
∫ θ∗
θ∗/2
(
f(0)n−1θn−1 + O(θn−1)
)
dθ +
O(θ∗)
θ∗
= 1− f(0)
n−1
θ∗F (θ∗)n−1
(
θ∗n
n
(1− 1
2n
) + O(θ∗n)
)
+
O(θ∗)
θ∗
.
Therefore,
lim
θ∗→0
Pˆθ∗(θ
∗)
θ∗
= 1− 1
n
(1− 1
2n
) =
n− 1
n
+
1
n2n
(85)
Similarly,
lim
θ∗→0
E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)]
θ∗
=
n− 1
n
(86)
and
lim
θ∗→0
E[θ˜(2) | θ˜(1) < θ∗]
θ∗
=
n− 1
n+ 1
. (87)
Moreover,
Pr[θ˜(2) < θ∗ < θ˜(1)]
Pr[θ˜(1) < θ∗]
= n
1− F (θ∗)
F (θ∗)
→θ∗→0 ∞. (88)
Taking (84), (85), (86), (87), and (88) together implies that R(θ∗) > R(0) if θ∗ is small.
QED
The final Proposition 6 assumes that the initial seller is a player who’s objective is to
maximize expected revenue. We maintain the assumption that the initial seller is restricted
to a second-price auction, but assume that she can set an arbitrary reserve price before the
auction begins. Proposition 6 shows that the initial seller’s revenue in such an extended
second-price auction game with resale can be smaller than her revenue in the absence of a
resale opportunity (where all bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their use values).11
Observe that a special case covered by Assumption 4 is that the resale seller is, like the
initial seller, restricted to a second-price auction with reserve price. Hence, Proposition 6
shows that the presence of a resale opportunity can be harmful to the initial seller even if
she has access to the same class of sales mechanisms as the resale seller.
11This result does not hold in environments with a single private-value bidder; cf. footnote 17 in the Note.
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Proposition 6 For any regular-bidder number n ≥ 2 and distribution F satisfying As-
sumption 1, let R∗ denote the initial seller’s revenue in a second-price auction when all
bidders bid their use values and she chooses an optimal reserve price.
Then, for all sufficiently large n and for all δ sufficiently close to 1, the extended second-
price auction game with resale where the initial seller can set a reserve price has a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium such that the initial seller’s expected revenue is smaller than R∗.
Proof. Let r∗ denote the reserve price that is optimal for the initial seller if all agents
bid their use values in period 1. We will show that if δ is sufficiently close to 1, then there
exists an equilibrium such that the initial seller sets a reserve price r > r∗ and her expected
revenue is smaller than R∗.
Because r∗ < 1 is independent of n (Myerson, 1981) and R∗ → 1 as n→∞,
r∗ < δR∗, (89)
assuming that n is sufficiently large and δ is sufficiently close to 1.
Observe that the speculator’s payoff in the θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ = 1 constructed in
Proposition 4 equals δR∗, and her auction bid bˆs > R∗ by (76) and Lemma 3. Hence, the
1-equilibrium remains valid, with a reduced payoff for the speculator, if the initial seller sets
any reserve price r < δR∗.
By (89), there exists r such that
r∗ < r < δR∗.
Using r we can construct continuation equilibria for the continuation games following any
reserve price r ≥ 0 by the initial seller. If r < r, let the 1-equilibrium be played in the
continuation game. If r > r, let the θ∗-equilibrium with θ∗ = 0 be played in the continuation
game. If r = r, let either the 1-equilibrium or the 0-equilibrium be played, depending on
which of these two leads to a higher initial seller revenue.
Given these continuation equilibria, every reserve price r < r results in an expected
revenue of r < R∗ for the initial seller. Any reserve price r > r leads to an initial seller
revenue below R∗ because otherwise we would have r = r∗ by definition of r∗. The reserve
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price r = r leads to the initial seller revenue r < R∗ if the 1-equilibrium is played, and leads
to an initial seller revenue below R∗ if the 0-equilibrium is played (if the revenue R∗ were
reached, we would have r = r∗ by definition of r∗). In summary, any reserve price r ≥ 0
leads to an initial seller revenue below R∗.
4 The English auction with resale
In this section we explain why the equilibrium outcomes that we have constructed for second-
price auctions with resale remain valid if in period 1 an English auction, as modelled by
Milgrom and Weber (1982), takes place. Observe that the second-price auction and the
English auction are not strategically equivalent because we are considering environments
with three or more bidders.
After the English auction is completed, the losers’ bids are publicly known, while the
winner’s bid remains private. This corresponds exactly to the bid revelation that we have
assumed in our analysis of the second-price auction with resale. Hence, if the bidders’
stopping points in the English auction are identical to their bids in the second-price auction,
the bidders’ payoffs are the same across the two auction formats. Thus, the only thing we
need to argue to show that the equilibrium outcomes of Proposition 4 remain valid for the
English auction is that bidding incentives are the same as in a second-price auction. The
difference between the second-price auction and the English auction is that the losing bids
become public during instead of after the auction, so that bidders can revise their beliefs
each time a bidder drops out.
We define bidding in the English auction as follows. Every bidder i ∈ I with use value
θi ∈ [0, 1] stops bidding at price 0 if θi < θ∗, and is willing to bid up to her use value if
θi > θ
∗, independently of who stays in and how long. The speculator is willing to bid up to
bˆs, also independently of who stays in and how long.
To see that these bidding strategies are optimal, consider first the speculator’s bidding
incentives, given the regular bidders’ strategies. At the bid 0, it is better to stay in than to
drop out because the latter means she foregoes her chances of winning and making a resale
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profit. If some regular bidder stays in beyond 0 as well, Bayesian updating requires the
speculator to believe that the use value of this regular bidder is distributed on the support
[θ∗, 1]. She expects the regular bidder to stay in up to her use value, which is beyond bˆs.
Hence, it is optimal for the speculator to drop out at bˆs. If one regular bidder deviates
by stopping at a bid in (0, θ∗], the speculator switches to the belief that the use value of
this regular bidder equals θ∗. Thus, if the speculator wins then she uses the same resale
mechanism as in the second-price auction case.
Now consider the bidding incentives of a bidder i ∈ I with use value θi ∈ [0, 1]. If θi < θ∗,
bidder i has no incentive to stay in beyond the bid 0, for the same reasons as in the second-
price auction case. Finally, consider the case θi > θ
∗. Bidder i will stay in until the price
reaches her use value because she expects the same from all other regular bidders once they
stay in at positive bids. When bidder i observes that a competing regular bidder drops out
at a bid in (0, θ∗], she switches to the belief that this regular bidder has the use value θ∗,
and it remains optimal for bidder i to stay in until the price reaches her use value.
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